




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REFLECTIONS
ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,
BY THE
Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE,
CONSIDERED;
ALSO,
OBSERVATIONS
ON
Mr. PAINE's PAMPHLET, INTITULED
THE RIGHTS OF MEN;
WITH
CURSORY REMARKS
ON THE
PROSPECT OF A RUSSIAN WAR,
AND
The CANADA BILL now pending.

By JAMES EDWARD HAMILTON, Esq.

Quid verum atque *utile* rogo, curo, et totus in hoc sum.

L O N D O N :

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P R E F A C E.

MY object in obtruding these sheets on the Public will be fully answered, if they should be the means of attracting the attention of our governors and reformers to Aristotle's incomparable Treatise on Politics, which will enable the one to proceed on steady principles of policy; and, perhaps, restrain the Democratical fanaticism of the others.

Though the *Stagirite* is an object of universal praise with every writer who has had occasion to mention him, yet I am fully of opinion there are but few, who have perused his works with due attention. However, *what Mr. Selden says of him* who was one of the most learned and judicious men that England ever produced, is so very remarkable,

markable, that I shall lay it before the reader. In his *Table Talk*, article *Truth*, he affirms, *that there never breathed that person to whom mankind was more beholden*. It would be impertinent in me to add any thing after such an eulogium from such a character. Though I cannot help remarking that in this work, Mr. Selden seems frequently to glance at the Democratical *Reveries* of Harrington, Milton, &c.

I have avoided all metaphysical disquisitions as being of little utility, frequently impertinent, and only bewildering persons unaccustomed to them; it being my view to lay the pure *utile* before the reader; convinced that in this state it will make its deepest impression.

I have inserted a few political reveries of my own, for which I must claim the reader's indulgence. Not expecting to have any readers who have not perused Mr. Burke's *Reflections*, I thought it unnecessary to swell this essay with a repetition of his arguments, when coinciding in opinion with him.

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REFLECTIONS
ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,
CONSIDERED.

HAVING been engaged for some time past in a literary enquiry concerning the faith of the Christians during the first ages of the Church; and though naturally far more inclined to political than ecclesiastical subjects, yet I was so circumstanced, that, had I paid any particular attention to the former, I would have lost the fruits of what I had collected regarding the latter; my mind unfortunately not being of that pliable nature, as that of some celebrated Moderns, who can vary their studies *ad libitum*, and I presume without any of them suffering by it. In comparison of such geniuses, I can be scarcely deemed an idiot, being sensible of an immediate confusion of ideas, when any new subject forces itself upon my attention. However, Aristotle reconciles me somewhat to myself

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for this limitedness of intellect, as he observes that a man cannot easily pay attention to many things at the same time; by *same time* meaning days, months, or years, if the subject should be found to demand the entire attention for such a space. As this philosopher attained to a more solid and comprehensive knowledge than ever it has fallen to the lot of any other man to arrive at; it may be presumed, that that method which he recommends to others, was the same which he himself pursued.

The many disagreeable feelings I was frequently conscious of, during this state, by finding myself debarred from making myself master of those causes which led to the French revolution, and of the proceedings of the National Assembly, can only be conceived by those persons commonly called Democratists, and who besides can say with Terence,

Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto.

However I submitted to what I deemed my duty: and having at length brought the enquiry to a period which enabled me to discontinue it for a while, I have seized the intermediate
time,

time, before I recommence my ecclesiastical studies, to consider what has been advanced concerning this revolution. Though it appears to be wonderful to others, yet I confess it does not appear to be so to me; for, when in France about ten years ago, I found the middle class of people almost universally of one sentiment, namely, alienated from the established government in church and state, and wishing in *their* stead that of England. Nay, happening to be at Strasburgh when the news of Rodney's victory arrived there, I was present when a young officer, in the presence of at least twenty others, held forth upon the advantages of a free political constitution, in comparison of that of France, with great ability for perhaps an hour. So that, upon the arrival of the news in July, 1789, of the opposition to the King's will, manifested by the National Assembly, I made up my mind concerning its final issue, namely, that the government of that country would become a pure Democracy; which every circumstance that has since taken place, strongly points out will be the catastrophe.

While in this state of mind Mr. Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* were announced, and shortly after a host of answerers. Before I proceeded to a careful perusal of either the one or the other, it occurred to me that a previous

examination of Aristotle's *Treatise on Politics* might enable me to form a true judgement upon the question. For, from my knowledge of several of the Democratists, I could entertain no doubt of the praise-worthiness of their motives : and I should have made the same conclusion in regard of Mr. Burke, though I had no knowledge whatever of his character, except from fame, which has proclaimed him a perfect philanthropist, and as such must, in the main, agree with his opponents, in having the *welfare of man* for his object, though he might differ from them with regard to the means, namely, the mode of government upon which it in a great measure depends. I therefore suspected that there might be something wrong in the principles upon which each of them had founded very different conclusions with respect to the French revolution.

Before I proceed farther, I do not think it irrelevant to observe here, that until within these two years, I have been among the foremost of the Democratists : nor did I begin to suspect the political soundness of the principles of this party, till the business of the wool bill had been settled about two years ago in Parliament, so much against the true interest of Great Britain : But during the discussion of which, though a bill of the most *serious consequences*, there could scarcely be got a sufficient

sufficient number of Members to form a House upon the days on which it was to be agitated ; for the very obvious reason, that had they attended and voted, agreeably to their conviction, against the bill, they would have thereby endangered their being returned representatives in the following parliament.—For, not like the scattered country gentlemen, who never act upon system, or as one body, had the manufacturing promoters of that bill been disappointed in their object, the manufacturers throughout the kingdom, in every branch, would have entered into a private, nay, perhaps into a public combination, to vote against those Members, who were inimical to it. I am inclined to think that the Minister himself might have got a hint, that if the bill did *not* pass, the manufacturing interest would declare itself against him, for, from the difficulty of making up a House at times I weakly imagined that the bill would fall to the ground, for this reason only, being the mildest death it could receive.—But such a hint, if there was a hint given, quickly procured a sufficient number of Members to attend. This affair satisfied me, that there was something wrong in the principles I had adopted. For I at once saw, that, were there established such a representation of the People as I had hitherto

hitherto contended for, it would be impossible, without bloodshed, ever to rectify such deviations from universal benefit to the peculiar advantage of one class of the people, in whose power the electing the Representatives would necessarily ever hereafter be. I thence concluded, that *in every well ordered State all persons depending on others, (as manufacturers upon the Master-manufacturers) for their daily bread, ought not to be entrusted with any political privileges, either in regard of choosing Members of Parliaments, or electing Magistrates.* For, depending on their employers, their extreme ignorance might render them dangerous instruments in the hands of a faction. Such mechanics Aristotle calls slaves, δούλοι, l. 3. ch. 5.

It is with difficulty men correct their own erroneous notions : yet, by the current of my thoughts concerning the *exclusion* of those persons from having a share in the government who *depended* upon others for their daily bread ; I was, I may say, necessarily led to discover that there was another class of people, which, in like manner, in every well-ordered government, ought to be equally excluded from interfering *politically* in what concerned government ; namely, *all those who bought to sell again, or who lived by traffick.* For such persons, being necessarily

farly taken up eight or ten hours in the day with their business, have not time sufficiently to reflect upon political questions, or regulations, to enable them to form a proper judgment of their own, with regard to the probable consequences of them. As this cannot be disputed, it necessarily follows, that, unless we choose to follow a very different practice in regard of government, from what we do in the other concerns of life, all persons, who are so taken up with their respective trades or business, as necessarily to preclude their attending to other concerns, should not, in a well-ordered state, be allowed any political privileges, no more than those persons who maintain themselves by their daily labour. Farther, persons of this description in general (though I acknowledge there are many exceptions) are so given up to self, or the making of money, that the prosperity of the country is a very secondary object with them.

Having come to these conclusions, which appeared to me to be so well founded, and obvious, that I thought no ingenuous, candid, or dispassionate person could object to them, whatever might be the sentiments of this justly celebrated ancient, I took up Aristotle's Treatise upon Politics, and was not a little surpris'd to find that these two classes of men are particularly ob-
jected

jected to by him ; against their having any political privileges vested in them, and for those very obvious reasons which had occurred to myself. Fortified by such an authority, I entertain no doubt of the solidity of them. Nay, I know that they are so by my own experience : and though the experience of an individual will by no means justify a general conclusion, I believe few persons who have canvassed counties, cities, &c. but have had ample experience of it. The fact being indisputable, it will bring Mr. Burke and his antagonists much nearer to one another than could be expected, unless indeed that the Democrats, in the phrenzy of their zeal, should boldly run counter to all experience. The authority of this celebrated antient should have the more weight upon this question, as having flourished just before, I may say, the extinction of the Grecian republics, it is obvious, that he must have had greater advantages in perceiving and considering the defects of this mode of government than what moderns can possess.

Some, perhaps, may imagine that this treatise of Aristotle's, instead of flowing from those principles implanted by the All-wise Creator in the breast of every human creature, is only a system, or rather a scheme adapted, *after the event*, to explain the causes of the destruction
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of these republics. But in this they would do him great injustice. For, so far from his treatise being regulated by what ought to be deemed only casual events, it in fact unfolds the causes of prosperity and misfortune, even of those Republics which perished after him : what he has advanced on this head, concerning Carthage, whose fate he pronounced a century before the first Punic War, is very remarkable, and the more so as he speaks very highly of its political constitution. But his sagacious mind was not so dazzled by some of the beauties of it, as to make him insensible of its peculiar defects. His principles farther explain how it has happened, that the Swiss governments, notwithstanding their very defective political constitutions, have been so little, if at all, subject to seditions : and why the more extensive kingly governments of Europe, notwithstanding their still more defective forms of government, are so free of the same defect. In a word, I will venture to affirm, that there are more just notions concerning government in this single treatise, which does not even exist entire, than in all the books which have been written on the same subject for two thousand years. I have read Machiavel, whom one of our historians, I think, calls the *Prince of Politicians*, and Harrington, Sydney, Locke,

&c. yet I scruple not to affirm, that if compared with Aristotle, they merit not the appellation of children.

We have an English exposition of this treatise by a Mr. Ellis, but whether judiciously executed or not, I can say nothing, having never seen it. If it be not well expounded by this gentleman, whoever would give a good translation of it, would be entitled to the appellation of a *Benefactor of his Country*.

Every writer whom I have met with, who mentions Aristotle, speaks of him as by far the first of philosophers. I have only read his Treatise upon Politics, which, though a part is lost, contains every thing that is well advanced upon government, in all the other treatises I have met with upon that subject: besides its being far more clearly developped. It is evident from several passages in this treatise, that it depended or connected with his Treatise on *Ethics* or *Morals*; and of course was founded upon his accurate and extensive knowledge of the human heart, which enabled him to foresee consequences, not only which were to come to pass shortly after his own time, but even it may be said, to all eternity; or while man preserves his present affections.

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Notwithstanding the universal praise which is bestowed upon this eminent philosopher, yet that his writings are very much unknown, nay, perhaps even by those who praise him, is very evident, from no notice having been at all taken of what he had advanced concerning government in his Treatise on Politics, during the American war, or the late commotions in France.

It is not my intention to offer a complete analysis of this treatise of Aristotle's. My object is only to point out those persons in whom this writer would vest the government, which are precisely those, whom I have already mentioned: namely, *those who have a sufficiency to enable them to live idle lives; and excluding from any share in it those others who depend on their labour for their daily bread; as also all those who buy to sell again, or that live by traffic.* As the determining in what persons the government ought to be vested is the foundation upon which the entire fabric of civil polity should be erected, the being agreed upon this head is indispensably necessary, ere any thing should be farther advanced. I shall therefore take it as a thing proved, that persons necessarily dependent, and those others whose object is sordid pelf, *ought* to be excluded from all concern in the government of a state; which I

think should not be allowed to be an extraordinary concession from the Democrats, till they are able to adduce one single instance of a government, in which persons of either of these descriptions were a constituent part, which deserved the name of a well-arranged government, in which the security of the person and property of the individual was chiefly, or at all consulted, when supposed to interfere with their interests, and in which an individual might employ his *intellectual faculties*, as was most agreeable to him without personal danger. For these circumstances, and these circumstances only, entitle a political constitution to the appellation of a happy, safe, and equal government.

It may perhaps be asked, who are those persons, which may be said to have a sufficiency to enable them to live without having recourse to bodily labour for their support. Here I profess that Aristotle affords no clue to direct me. Perhaps in that part of his Treatise upon Politics which is lost, this very necessary question had been resolved. If so, as the loss is irreparable, it depends on the moderns to fill up the chasm.

Having little dependance upon my own sagacity, what I shall offer upon this head, however conclusive and solid it may appear to myself,

self, I shall entertain great suspicion of, when unsupported by, I might almost say, my infallible guide.

It is obvious, that the same annual revenue, or *census*, differs in value according to the situation of the place where the valuation is made: For instance 100*l.* is of far less value at London than at John a Groat's House, that is, it has far less power; which is what I here mean by value. It is evident that a man of 500*l.* a year in Middlesex is a man of little political influence in consequence of his fortune: but in the north of Scotland a person of such an estate would be a person of some consequence: therefore, if the *census* was to be determined *directly* as the income there would be great injustice: for in this case persons of much greater political consequence and independence would be excluded all share in the government, in consequence of their property lying at a distance from the capital, which rendered it of less nominal value, though of more real influence, than another nearer the capital of a greater annual income. The proprietor would justly deem this injustice, which would give rise to heart-burnings, dissatisfactions, &c. the forerunners of seditions, &c.

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The *desideratum* then is, to find out some object which will *for ever* determine the relative consequence of the constituent Members of the State, and this I apprehend may, in a great measure, be effected by the *price of labour*. For instance, a labouring man in Middlesex, with his family, will be able to earn three times more money in a year, than a labouring man and family will do in the north of Scotland. As this cannot be disputed, it follows, that 500*l.* a year in the north of Scotland is equal in influence to 1500*l.* a year in Middlesex: because it commands an equal portion of labour. Though little acquainted with the inhabitants of those two countries, I am inclined to think, that a gentleman of 500*l.* a year in the north of Scotland, is at least equal in personal consequence and respectability with a gentleman of thrice that income in Middlesex.

Having, as I apprehend, discovered the proper *medium* for regulating the *census*, it may be secondly demanded, what I deem to be a proper census, or annual income, to entitle its possessor to be a citizen, or have a share in the government, either directly or indirectly? This I apprehend is also in a great measure answered. For, as the earnings of the labourer are in general held to be *half* of the amount of the earnings or
income

income of himself and family, it follows, that that person who enjoys a certain annuity for his own life of such amount as to *double* the earnings or income of the labourer wherever he happens to reside, ought to be deemed to be a person who may support himself without manual labour, or lead an idle life. So that if the earnings of a labourer and his family in Middlesex amount to 50*l.* a year, so much should his annual life-income amount to who resides in Middlesex, to entitle him to the privilege of voting for Representatives in Parliament. But in the north of Scotland, where the earnings of a labouring man and his family perhaps exceed not the *third* part of 50*l.* or 16*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a census or annual life-income of 16*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* ought to be deemed *there*, as having equal power, to be equivalent to an annual income of 50*l.* in Middlesex, and sufficient to entitle its possessor to the same privileges as the inhabitant of Middlesex of a *triple* greater annual income. So that, *as* the labourer's wages would be throughout the kingdom, *so* in like manner should be the income, throughout the several parts of the kingdom, required to entitle its possessor to the privileges of citizenship, that is, of voting for Representatives, or of being elected a Representative, or of acting as a Juryman : or, as Aristotle concisely
 says,

says, a person capable of passing judgment and of being a Magistrate. τῷ μετεχειν κρισεως καὶ αρχης.
Lib. 3. c. 1.

What Aristotle has advanced concerning government is so simple, so clear, and so convincing, when compared to the indistinct muddy writings of the moderns, that it alone evinces that these in general have *presumptuously* written from their own imaginations, unsupported by any experience, since they must have known of the existence of this inimitable, though imperfect, treatise on government, which could not be locked up from them on account of their general proficiency in the dead languages. A treatise also composed by the ablest head that ever existed; and upon a more general experience than will ever again perhaps offer itself to man.

This incomparable philosopher observes, that there are three distinct sorts of *direct*, straight, or legitimate governments; i. e. governments in which the *governors* and *governed* are in unison, each approving of the established political constitution of the State: namely, the *Kingly*, which first of all takes place in infant societies, the Members of which, after agreeing to some laws and regulations concerning the general government, appoint one of themselves to be King (Βασιλευς) to enforce them; and when any thing unpro-
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vided for occurs, he was commissioned to act according to his judgment. The reason why this power was vested in *one* man, Aristotle assigns to be, the difficulty of finding *many* persons, in the first stages of society, capable of executing the powers of government. This appears to me to be not only solid; but also a just delineation of the governments which exist among the North Americans and other newly discovered savages.

The second sort of *direct* government is, where the powers of government are vested in the *best* of the inhabitants; *elected* or chosen to their respective offices by the other Members of the Community. This sort of government he calls an Aristocracy. *Election* being that which constituted it to be such: it being *essential* to it.

The third sort of *direct* government, and to which, in preference to every other form, he gives a decided preference, as being the most conducive towards promoting the temporal prosperity and the mental improvement of its Members, is what he calls a Politeia or Commonwealth. To form such a political constitution it is necessary, that the supreme council of the nation, be it called Senate, Great Council, or Parliament, *should be composed of a certain number of citizens elected* VIVA VOCE, *who of course*

would be chiefly the richest and most powerful citizens : and a proportionate or equal number of other citizens chosen BY SUFFRAGE who of consequence would be the most virtuous part of the citizens. Were these chosen by election, he observes, that only such would in general be elected as were agreeable to the rich, and therefore in this case might be dispensed with as of no use.

Those of our modern reformers, who insist upon our Members of the *Commons House of Parliament* being *viva voce* elected, would be guilty of an absurdity, or a *felo de se*, according to Aristotle : for such Members, instead of being *Democrats*, or defenders of the rights of the lower classes of the citizens, would be *Aristocrates*. I cannot help recommending to them, in their future exertions for the public good, to be guided by this great philosopher, who seems to have profited from his observations.

How greatly must the liberal reader of this treatise conceive of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, who countenanced and cherished the man who so clearly, and philosophically asserted the happiness and welfare of the human species, to be the ultimate object, and *primum mobile* of every lawful government. Great souls have no fear. They feel their own superiority. Their object is to cherish the sublime and virtuous cha-

characters wherever they are likely to be met with.

Aristotle, having set forth these three sorts of *direct* government, observes, that there are corruptions of each of them : of the *first*, when the King, instead of acting upon principles of *general* good, acts from *selfish* motives, preferring his own interest to that of the citizens at large. This mode of governing he calls a *Tyranny*. *Secondly*, when the Aristocracy, or the best and richest Members of a state, manage the public affairs with the view of benefiting themselves, regardless of the general interest of the citizens : this he calls an *Oligarchy*. *Thirdly*, when the powers of government being vested in the general body of the citizens, the public affairs are carried on in such a manner as to favour the Poor *only*, who are necessarily the majority of every society, regardless of the *rights* of the Rich : This sort of government he calls a *Democracy*. According to this philosopher then there are three sorts of *direct* or lawful governments, namely, *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, and a *Politeia*, or a Commonwealth composed of an Aristocracy and a Democracy combined in *one Council* : and three corruptions of these : *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, and *Democracy*. All other forms of

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government he shews to be deviations, more or less, from one or other of these.

Aristotle further shews, that the natural progress of government is first Monarchy—secondly Aristocracy—thirdly Oligarchy—fourthly Tyranny—fifthly a Democracy. Also that wealth is the polar star of Oligarchies : honour of Aristocracies : and liberty of Democracies : the truth of which both ancient and modern history have evinced. Our modern reformers would think their cause was lost, were they to admit that *Kingly* government was the first *lawful* government, as founded upon consent : and still more, that Aristocracy was the next in succession. But this was no stumbling block in the way of Aristotle : For he placed the foundation of government upon the assent of the citizens, that is, of those persons who had entered upon their *fiftieth* year, and who were able to support themselves without labour : and who must in every government be a very different set of people from a base populace, or sordid shopkeepers, manufacturers, and tallow-chandlers, as they are in general : In short he lays it down, that an equal Commonwealth can be only constituted among a highly improved people, in which the citizens should receive a public education,

cation, that they might hereafter be useful citizens.

We modern reformers, it seems, are always above or below the mark. If a public education is to be the adopted mode, our notions become sublime; and *all the people* are to be publicly educated. The Grecian commonwealths are quoted as examples of its feasibility. But no Greek ever entertained such a romantic idea. The ordinary education of the middle classes in life does not secure them from falling victims to every species of vice: and yet he would be a hardy adventurer, who would declare, that the education intended for the children of the poor by Sunday schools, approaches, in any essential respect, to that which the children of the decent classes of life actually do receive.

Aristotle, having discriminated the above-mentioned six sorts of government, observes, that all the evils which have sprung up in societies, have arisen from two causes: first, by those persons, who being sensible that they were equal to other persons in *one* respect, thought they were equal to them in *every* respect: for these having shewn, that by nature, all men are equal, they therefore claimed equal rights: but he observes, that this mode of arguing is sophistical, being from
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the particular to the universal : besides, though it be granted, that *by nature* all men are equal, yet society having had for its object the preservation and security of the *already acquired property* in the individuals, in whom it was at that time vested ; its first members, therefore, must have been *proprietors*. Hence it is evident, that if other individuals, *without property*, joined themselves to this society, they would not be intitled to a portion of the properties of the first, or constituent members of the society. It is even obvious, that they might think themselves fortunate in being entertained as servants or slaves.

The *second* cause of the misfortunes which spring up in societies, is, that those individuals, who, in *some* respects, as the advantages of fortune, birth, &c. being superior to other men, conclude that they are therefore superior to them in *every* respect : this being also obviously arguing from the particular to the universal : for persons of this disposition, proud of their accidental advantages, by claiming the solid ones of governing their inferiors, gave rise to seditions, which terminated either in victory or defeat, in an Oligarchy or a Democracy. Few, I apprehend, are so unversed in human affairs as not to have been frequently sensible of these sophistical

phistical modes of arguing in the advocates of Oligarchy and Democracy.

The great object of every legislator, according to this profound philosopher, should be to discover what mode of government would most conduce to the happiness of those individuals, *who can live according to their fancies*, that is, *idle lives*, without following any calling or profession. This I apprehend is contrary to every political idea actually received among mankind, be them advocates of tyranny—of Oligarchy—of Aristocracy—or of Democracy—I trust, however, I shall evince its justness.

Such a mode of government he lays down to be this : the magistrates to be ELECTED by the people ; for these should always be the *principal* persons of the State.—Secondly, a Council, Senate, or Parliament, partly chosen *by election*, and partly by *suffrage*, and of course composed of the first and richest citizens, and of the best and most virtuous : each thus tempering the other.—The *ultimate* judgment, or of giving verdicts, to be in the citizens, that is, of those who had a wherewithal to support themselves without labour.

Aristotle farther observes, that no person should be capable of acting as a citizen, or as we would say, of having the privilege of voting for a Representative in Parliament, or acting as

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a Juryman, before he had compleated his *forty-ninth* year : neither should he be capable of being returned as a Representative for Parliament, nor of acting as a Juryman after his *seventieth* year. In what light would our beardless legislators hold such a regulation. It was not advanced upon the authority of *Vandalic* or *Gothic* wisdom, or rather absurdity. It is the result of the combined and matured wisdom fortified by experience of the wisest people hitherto known.

Before men have arrived at the perfection of their rational faculties, which Aristotle fixes at their *fiftieth* year, they ought not to be entrusted with the management of the public concerns of a great nation, where an error may entail so many evils upon posterity. At the age of seventy, men begin to be too cautious, and have not sufficient enterprize to seize the fortunate incidents perpetually offering themselves, which would tend to the benefit of the community.

Aristotle observes that the feasible only should be attempted, when a reform in government is in contemplation. Might not then a partial reform take place immediately among ourselves : but with regard to this last particular concerning the legislative age, the *evil day*, “when
“ children would cease to rule over us,” might
be,

be, and perhaps with advantage too, postponed for twenty or twenty-five years.

Perhaps it may be thought, that Aristotle having chiefly in view the small Grecian republics, his observations concerning the best form of government relate only to very circumscribed states : but he will greatly deceive himself who makes such a conclusion. For this philosopher's wish was that all Greece should be reduced into a single republic, in order that it might be enabled thereby to conquer the world, and effectually promote the happiness of all its inhabitants, by the establishment of good governments : and doubtless intended that his maxims should be applicable to a commonwealth, composed of all the republics in Greece, which would have been, with regard to extent and population, the most extensive and populous hitherto known : and evinces, contrary to what has been advanced by Lord Kaimes and others, that a republican form of government is not solely adapted to states of small extent ; at least that they are not supported in their notion by the greatest, without comparison, of the antients.

Perhaps the following sketch for an improvement of our political constitution will not be found very repugnant to what Aristotle teaches concerning such modifications. The kingly

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power to remain as it is: one Council consisting of six hundred Members, of which three hundred to be chosen *by election*, who of course would be Lords, or Commoners of great consequence from money or landed wealth: the other three hundred *by suffrage*, who we may suppose would be the most virtuous characters of the nation. The three kingdoms to be united, which ought to be effected, *coute qui coute*; it might cost a million of money to influence the Irish to embrace a measure which would tend more to her happiness and prosperity than her fettered Parliament will be able, or rather allowed, to effect for centuries: the three kingdoms to be divided into certain divisions, as nearly equal in population, with respect to *citizens*, as might be: each division to return to the Great Council three Members *by election*, and three Members *by suffrage*, to continue Members of it, *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, or until the majority of the *citizens* signified their desire to the proper officer of choosing a new or other delegates: all the citizens to be entered in the Sheriff's or other returning officer's book; who should appoint an annual regular meeting upon a certain day, for registering and examining the pretensions of those, who would offer themselves for that purpose. As every person should be obliged

obliged to serve his country who was elected, did it happen that any of those who were chosen *by suffrage* were persons not possessing 1000*l.* a year, freehold property; the deficiency in this respect ought to be made up to them for their attendance out of the Treasury. Besides this great council, there ought to be another of one hundred Members, which should enjoy the judicial power as at present exercised by the House of Lords: one to be chosen by each of the hundred divisions: to be persons *above fifty* years of age: and each of them to be entitled to 1000*l.* a year from the Treasury, while they acted in this capacity. The auditing the public accounts, of whatever nature: the punishing culprits, whom the existing laws would not affect, *even capitally*: that is, when they found it necessary they should apply to the Great Council for an act of attainder, which, upon examining the case should act according to its discretion: &c. &c.

It strikes me, that a judicature of this nature would be much more unobjectionable than our House of Lords. Legislators should not be their own Expositors. I apprehend the judicature appointed by the Houses of Commons and Lords, from amongst their Members, to try East Indian culprits, labours under this defect. Aristotle was for having the Magistracy in the

rich but elected : and the judicature, or that which passed sentence, in the citizens. However, as our constitution actually exists, perhaps the present mode is in a great measure unexceptionable.

I am farther to observe, that vesting the powers of the community, or the right of citizenship, or of voting for Representatives, or of passing sentence as Jurors, in persons who enjoy a sufficiency to enable them to live idle lives, and the having only *one Great Council*, or House of Parliament, is not so great an alteration from the feudal system of government, as our present form. Originally there was only one House of Parliament, composed of the tenants *in capite* : the chief of whom acquired the appellation of Barons, and whose voices were generally decisive concerning the business in hand : this, independently of the expences which necessarily followed upon attending in Parliament, was the reason, why the poorer tenants *in capite* avoided attending : which was the less necessary, as what the greater tenants or Barons had determined in regard of themselves *proportionably* took place with regard to them : so that the lesser tenants *in capite*, were certain of having their rights defended ; for, except the greater tenants *in capite*, or the Barons were first oppressed, they could not be oppressed.

oppressed. In like manner it is declared in the great charter, that no man should be condemned and punished except in the judgment of his peers, or due process of law. But who were peers or *pares* in those days? doubtless neither despised shopkeepers, mechanics, nor manufacturers: they were tenants *in capite*, to whom this appellation could at all apply: therefore the vesting the judicial power in those who can pass *idle lives*, or live upon their income, would be not only acting agreeably to the judgment of Aristotle, but also in a great measure to that of our ancestors; for tenants *in capite* must be allowed to have enjoyed such a share of this world's goods, as to have enabled them to live *idle lives*.

That none but tenants *in capite* had originally a right of being present, or of being represented in Parliament, I apprehend, is proved by Doctor Henry, in his History of England, and by Mr. Miller in his incomparable, one might almost say, divinely-inspired Essay on the British Constitution. Those who insinuate the contrary, without attempting a confutation of these learned and ingenious writers, are methinks much to blame, as misleading the people.

I shall now proceed to consider the justness of Mr. Burke's charge against the National Assembly,

bly, namely, “ *that the Members of it are utterly incompetent to the work upon which they have engaged: to wit, of forming a new political constitution for France.*” This he shews by examining their regulations concerning the constituting the *future National Assemblies*—concerning the *future Magistracy*—and concerning the *Judicature*—I shall not repeat his invincible arguments, proving beyond doubt their absolute fatuity in what they have determined concerning each of these subjects; and in each, as has been seen, he is supported by Aristotle. But, according to Aristotle, these three heads are the most important of those which should engage the attention of the Legislator: therefore their having failed upon each of them evinces their utter incompetency as Legislators.

Secondly, Mr. Burke has farther proved their incompetency, beyond the power of contradiction, from their regulations concerning the army and finance. Their absurdities respecting the former are scarcely credible. Mr. Burke’s account on this head is not contradicted by Monsieur Depont.—Their financial regulations are, equally exceptionable. Farther, Mr. Burke has *evinced*, that in regard of the clergy they have acted *unjustly*; and towards their King *ungenerously*: thus poisoning the sources of virtuous
energy:

energy. Yet there is an anonymous publication in which the writer, modestly becoming his own judge, taxes those incomparable *reflections*, doubtless the offspring of honest indignation, which I doubt not will reflect more honour upon England, than any political tract of the age, with being *intemperate*. Let him evince his thesis by the authority of an Aristotle—of a Polybius—or even of a Machiavel; and then, but not before, he may be listened to. The weakness and folly of this Assembly is beyond belief. They expect to be a *powerful* nation, and yet they have destroyed all military discipline—They expect to be a powerful nation, yet have deprived themselves of the sources of finance. In future the army will pay only what obedience it chuses. The citizens what taxes they think fit. Their Monarch is dethroned, and will *never* acquire any future authority—Their Monarch has been abased, and will be more so.

It may be asked, is there no remedy for all this evil? I answer, I believe not. No future authority can exist in the nation itself, unless a long civil, or foreign war, should take place, either of which I think very unlikely to happen; during which, a party, or an individual, might acquire so much authority as to enable it, or him, to enforce, by means of an *obedient, well-*
paid

paid army, a system of taxation equivalent to support the expences of a powerful state.

With regard to the individuals who compose the National Assembly, I entertain no doubt of their integrity and patriotism *in general*. What Mr. Burke objects to them is their *incompetency*: and yet they had an outline before them so obvious, that they are scarcely to be excused for deviating from it: I mean the British Constitution, which ten years ago I know to have been the ultimate wish of *every* rational Frenchman that I had conversed with: and surely the British Constitution, without its obvious defects, I mean our imperfect representation in the Lower House, might satisfy, even an ardent patriot: nay, it was far preferable even to a better political constitution, because, in case of any disputes arising between the French King and his subjects, arguments adduced from the British Constitution and its practice in like cases, would be conclusive against royalty, so that whilst England preserved her freedom, a counter-revolution would have been hopeless in France. The patriots should farther have known, that Slaves are not at once capable of acting the part of freemen: that men in general to be such must be educated for this state: therefore, till this took place, it was a glorious circumstance to
secure

secure so capital a political constitution until (subject scarcely to any form) the succession of the next generation, which might be educated for a more perfect state of freedom: though I profess that I think the English Constitution, modified agreeably to reason and good sense; or being made more consonant to Aristotle's idea, might satisfy the most ardent wish of the most violent Democate: I mean, by making the Members of Parliament the Representatives of those persons who, having the *wherewithal* to support themselves and families, pursued none of the sordid trades, and who had entered into their *fiftieth* year, to be elected by ballot—and continue Representatives *quamdiu se bene gesserint*.

But, as the Members of the National Assembly have quitted this obvious line of conduct, it may be asked, what they should *now* do. I sincerely confess my incompetency to answer this question. Mr. Burke, in the continuation of his *Reflections*, will perhaps point out their proper line of conduct. But as perhaps he may *not* do it, and as often an ill-judged idea has given birth to better founded ones, I shall not scruple offering my notion, in hopes that it will induce others to do the same; and thus perhaps something useful on this side the water may be produced: for with regard to the other side I utterly despair of it.

The first thing I would recommend would be the returning upon their steps, and establishing the British Constitution agreeably to what has been just advanced. But there is an evil which is overwhelming the state, and which, unless instantly opposed, will render every scheme abortive for introducing happiness into that distracted and unfortunate kingdom; namely, the want of employment of the poor: for the wealth of the entire world would not feed the Poor of France; whereas industry will at once effect it; and when effected, it would then be a flourishing, happy, and powerful kingdom, under a *proper* government: but until then, NEVER.

The object then is to find employment, productive employment, for the Poor. *Coute qui coute*, this must be deemed the *fine qua non*. It can be only effected, even gradually, by means of great premiums to the *manufacturers of goods of the staple of France*: I say, to the *manufacturers*, and not according to modern practice, to merchant-exporters: if the goods be manufactured exporters will always be found; besides, that it is far more eligible, that premiums to the amount of from one to ten thousand pounds should be distributed among many, than swallowed up by one. Agriculture should likewise be encouraged:

raged : in a word every thing should be done to induce those persons who can command a capital to employ it in manufactures of one sort or other.

To bring this about with a speedy effect would doubtless require four or five millions annually. But where, it will be asked, is such a sum to be procured ? I have already said *coute qui coute*, be the money where it will, it must be got, and for this purpose only. For till this is effected nothing can be done. Whether the sale of the crown lands—whether the reducing the fleet to twenty or thirty frigates, and other naval expences proportionably—whether the reducing the army to one hundred thousand well-disciplined and *well-paid* men, or half that number, would admit of an application of such a sum from the public service, is more than I can determine : but if it would not, the deficiency should be made up from the sale of clerical property, and the needful deduction from the public annuities, or creditors. It is obvious, that this evil would lessen annually, for the taxes, in consequence of the encreasing wealth of the *people*, whom I shall not decorate with the appellation of *citizens*, would become daily more productive. It is also needless to observe, that it would be absolutely necessary to engage a certain sum for a series of years, perhaps twenty,

from the public income, towards the encouragement of each kind of manufacture, to induce wealthy capitalists to risk their property.

Secondly, there is a preferable scheme, namely, a deputation of a select number of the National Assembly, with a letter to Mr. Burke from *the King of the French*, requesting that he would take upon himself the new-modelling the French constitution. This may be thought a *Jeu d'esprit*, but I profess I never was more serious. The antient republics had recourse to expedients of this nature, and that not seldom. Nay, even the republics in Italy, during the middle ages, had frequently recourse to it, if I recollect rightly. To possess magnanimity may be thought now-a-days a quaint idea. If the National Assembly possess any, it should surely adopt this measure, unless a better one would offer itself. As to their own insufficiency it is needless, after what has been said upon it, to dwell on it farther. Mr. Burke has approved himself the ablest politician of the age; and doubtless the magnanimity of such a proceeding in the National Assembly would rouse every latent faculty of his soul to realize their expectations. But notwithstanding the brilliancy, and I may add, the policy of such a measure, I think it would not *now* answer. The want of discipline

discipline in the army—the inability of the people to pay taxes—the Democratic principles pervading every part of this unfortunate country, would render abortive the efforts of any individual, though invested with the greatest civil power, unaccompanied with a well-disciplined army to enforce obedience. I say then, that Mr. Burke, foreseeing these obstructions, and the consequences of them, would, in my apprehension, refuse accepting the office of legislator. I would then recommend to the French nation, though *thirdly* and lastly, what would be most advantageous to themselves, and to the world at large, namely, of

Becoming a Member of the British empire, as Ireland is. It is needless to observe, that she might make almost her own terms, conditionally that she engaged herself to have the same friends and foes as Britain. In this case her fleet might be reduced with safety to the number of frigates I have mentioned. Their troops to fifty or sixty thousand men. The savings to be applied towards giving energy and life to national industry. The English constitution was the wish of France. Such an union would be better to her than the English constitution; for it would be acquiring the real power of Britain for an empty name, for such it must ever be with regard to the governed,

governed. The interest of the empire would inspire all its citizens and inhabitants. Abilities, whether French or English, Scotch or Irish, might direct our councils, or lead our common troops to victory. I protest that the advantages to France from such an union are so obvious, and so important, that her not proposing an union of this nature, (for it solely depends on her), can only be imputed to her being made subservient to the views or ambitious designs of factious citizens.

The desire of the Patriots in France, of forming a perpetual league of amity with this country, and which our Democrates so strongly insist upon, evinces one of two things : first, that by means of such a league of amity, it was the intention of the National Assembly to cultivate a *sincere* friendship with this country ; and by means of this union to impose peace upon the disturbers of Europe : or the offer was intended with the *insidious* intent to support the *Democratic* faction of this kingdom, and thereby enable it to overturn the government. If the latter was *not* their real, though concealed motive, nothing ought to prevent them from proposing such an union. In fact, their not doing so, will evince beyond the power of cavil, that ambitious motives influence the leaders of the French revolution,

tion, and not the prosperity of France. For no one can be so absurd as to affirm, that the union would be more sincere and intimate, were each state governed by *different* Kings, as they would be under *one* King.

It will be easily perceived from what I have said, that I esteem his Most Christian Majesty to be in fact *dethroned*. To suppose the contrary, would beyond doubt vince idiotism. For, though I should admit that he *actually* enjoys a million sterling annually, yet how long will he continue so to enjoy it? Precisely so long as it shall please the French mob. Let us suppose that the present government subsists some time: in this case, the pressing distresses of the mechanics, manufacturers, and artists, there being little or no demand in these distressful times for the productions of their skill and ingenuity, will necessarily compel them to extremities. Some factious demagogue will perhaps observe, that in those distressing times, when the poor are starving, that a single Family has an income sufficient to make happy *two hundred thousand* families, or a million of individuals. Arguments of this nature, though in fact ruinous to the lower classes in the end, will, for the present, so strike upon their imagination, as to deprive them of the ability of foreseeing the consequence.

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The National Assembly being only the creatures of the mob, as dependant on the populace, and being little better than a mob itself, will, nay, must, take the watch-word from their creators. The income of majesty is reduced to a *tenth* of what it was, and shortly after to a *tenth* of a *tenth*. Nay perhaps, after voting the kingly office useless, and burthensome, they may take the *provident* care of enabling the Dauphin to earn his subsistence, by binding him an apprentice to a taylor; as the Long Parliament, I think, acted with respect to the Princess Elizabeth, whom they bound to a mantua-maker, after cutting her father's head off. So that in fact, I think an union of the kingdoms equally desirable by the King of the French, as by his subjects. He and his brothers may be very well allowed three, four, or five hundred thousand pounds sterling a year, which will enable them to live more happy lives than they have ever done.

I know there are some who think, that France, in its present debilitated state, will be attacked by some of the neighbouring powers; but in my apprehension such an idea is very ill-founded. For though I shall admit the debilitated state of France, yet were she attacked, every nerve would be exerted against the common enemy. In fact I make no doubt but she would drive Germany before
before

before her. Politicians and great captains would quickly spring up among her citizens : besides the seditions that they would give rise to in their enemies' country. In a word, an attack on the side of Germany, might shake to its very center the Germanic body. France has nothing to fear but from Britain ; whose policy it certainly is not to embarrass herself with French politics, otherwise than as intimated. France will be weakened more in three years by her absurd measures, than she would be by a twenty years unsuccessful war with Britain.

I think it will not be imputed to presumption, the giving my opinion of these *Reflections of Mr. Burke's*, as though I thought myself competent to the task : I hereby acknowledge myself utterly unequal to it : nevertheless I cannot avoid making use of my privilege in declaring the satisfaction which I felt in the careful perusal of this incomparable production, after I had read Aristotle's Treatise on Politics, for such it appeared to me. Nothing that I have met with in the English language at all approaching to it, either in depth or solidity of thought : and with regard to language, leaving all other treatises of a like nature, far, very far behind indeed. Some condemn the language as being too flowery ; in my apprehension the language varies with the na-

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ture of his subject, and appears throughout natural.

Writings I apprehend should be estimated proportionally to the novelties which they contain—the importance of those novelties—and the vehicle or language by which they are conveyed. I have been directed by these views in passing my judgment of this justly celebrated work.

Though a very incompetent judge of its perfections, yet I am not such an enthusiastic admirer, as not to think that I perceive some errors in it; besides some notions which experience has evinced to be unfounded. In what I shall advance upon the former head, I trust that Mr. Burke will find that I am supported by the first of all authorities, Aristotle; which I am confident will acquit me in his eyes of petulance, or an over-weaning conceit, as presuming myself extraordinary clever in venturing to criticise the ablest, beyond dispute, of our modern politicians: the fact is, it is Aristotle *versus* Burke.

Page 287, Mr. Burke says, “ Your all-sufficient legislators, in their hurry to do every thing at once, have forgot one thing that seems essential, and which, I believe, never has been in the theory or the practice omitted by any projector of a republic. They have forgot to constitute a *Senate*, or something of
“ that

“ that nature and character. Never before this
 “ time, was heard of a body politic composed
 “ of *one* legislative and active assembly, and
 “ its executive officers, without such a council;
 “ without something to which foreign states
 “ might connect themselves; something to
 “ which, in the ordinary detail of business, the
 “ people could look up; something which
 “ might give a bias, a steadiness, and preserve
 “ something like consistency in the proceedings
 “ of the state. Such a body Kings generally
 “ have as a council. A monarchy may exist
 “ without it; but it seems to be in the very es-
 “ sence of a republican government. It holds
 “ a sort of middle place between the supreme
 “ power exercised by the people, or *imme-*
 “ *diately* delegated from them, and the mere
 “ executive. Of this there are no traces in
 “ your constitution; and, in providing nothing
 “ of this kind, your Solons and Numas have,
 “ as much as any thing else, discovered a so-
 “ vereign incapacity.” This paragraph ap-
 pears to me to be absolutely unfounded. In
 Aristotle’s model of a republic there was only to
 have been *one* assembly.—In the Cretan republic
 there was only *one* also.—In the Carthaginian re-
 public *one* only.—In the Lacedemonian *one* coun-
 cil only.—In the Athenian, *one* assembly only.—

In the Roman republic one assembly only, where foreign affairs were agitated; till towards the latter end of the republic, the people assembled in the *Comitia Tributa*, also determined such matters; which ended in the ruin of the republic. It is true, that in the Oligarchies of modern Europe, vulgarly and erroneously called Aristocratic republics, there are I believe universally *two* councils of this nature; but the absurdity of such political constitutions has been evinced, as appeared to me, long since by Rousseau, in his *Letters from the Mountains*, in which he examines the constitution of the republic of Geneva: and so far from such councils being *of the very essence of republican government*, he has further shewn from *experience*, that they must necessarily terminate in *Oligarchies*. So that on this head *the sovereign incapacity of the National Assembly* does not appear, but the contrary.

It is very evident from various passages in these reflections, that Mr. Burke apprehends, that in every well-constituted government, there should be two deliberative councils, of the nature of our House of Lords and Commons. [See *Reflexions*, page 75.] Yet Aristotle seems not to have been aware of the necessity of two councils. I don't recollect that he even hints at them. He was for defending
wealth,

wealth, or the *Aristocracy*, by having a portion of the Members of his legislative assembly chosen *viva voce*, the other Members by *suffrage*, who of course would be the persons most esteemed for their abilities and virtues; and being united in one council, each part would temper the other: and which, I must insist on, is far preferable to dividing them into two councils. For without undue influence it cannot be supposed, that the wealthy would agree to the propositions of the less opulent citizens, and *vice versa*. It is farther evident, that which ever first yielded to the other, would in every subsequent trial of strength, be less able to resist its rival. The Roman republic has evinced this to be well founded. Perhaps that of England also.

Page 274, Mr. Burke says, "It is for this
 " very reason, that Montesquieu observed very
 " justly, that in their *classification* of the *citizens*,
 " the *great legislators* of antiquity made the great-
 " est display of their powers, and even soared
 " above themselves, &c." Concerning the regulation of the legislators of antiquity, I cannot say much, having only perused one of them; but, he without comparison, the very greatest. This philosopher, though he has divided the *inhabitants* into, I think, ten classes, has made no such arrangement with regard to the *citizens*,
 making

making every citizen equally eligible to every office. Though he was for putting the magistracy, at least of the higher order, in the hands of the most opulent citizens; yet he would not have this brought about by means of invidious laws, as in Britain, with regard to burgessees and knights of the shire: no! he depended upon human nature in this respect, well knowing that the rich would be almost always elected to such offices, when the election was to be determined by votes taken *viva voce*: and being further sensible that such distinctions create heart-burnings, &c. and do more mischief than the apprehended evils tenfold. His foresight in this respect is evinced by the Roman government. For the senate, by opposing a participation of equal rights, enabled the Demagogues to form the people into a compact well-disciplined body, and by means of *Plebiscita*, or decrees of the people, to overthrow the paramount authority of the senate, and thereby, doubtless, caused all the disturbances at Rome which terminated in the loss of its liberties. Methinks also that such classifications have a tendency towards introducing *Oligarchical* forms of government, which Aristotle has stigmatized with the epithet of *illegitimate*.

Page 281, Mr. Burke says, “ What signifies
 “ the empty compliments paid to the country
 “ by

“ by giving it perhaps *more* than its share in the
 “ theory of your representation ?” I must object
 to this passage. For Aristotle has observed
 that farmers are the *best* citizens—that graziers
 are the *next best*—but buyers and sellers, &c. the
 very *worst*. Now too much power cannot be
 vested in farmers, for, as he observes, they are
 always for keeping things as they are. If this
 observation applied properly to Greece, its force
 will be encreased ten-fold in regard of the
 French.

Page 285, Mr. Burke says, “ No man was
 “ ever attached by a sense of pride, partiality,
 “ or real affection to a description of square
 “ admeasurement. He never will glory in be-
 “ longing to the Checquer No. 71, or to any
 “ other badge ticket.” Has Mr. Burke for-
 gotten Cesar’s *tenth* legion ?

That Mr. Burke is no Tory, as some per-
 haps may insinuate, is clearly evinced from his
 saying in the outset of his *Reflections* “ I do
 “ most *heartily* wish that France may be ani-
 “ mated by a *spirit of national* liberty, and that
 “ I think you *bound*, in all *honest policy*, to pro-
 “ vide a *permanent* body, in which *that spirit*
 “ may *reside*, and an *effectual organ* by which it
 “ may *act*.” p. 1. Again, “ a *permanent* assembly,
 “ in

“ in which the *Commons* had *their share* of power,
 “ would soon abolish whatever was *too invidious*
and insulting in these distinctions.” p. 204. The
 unbiassed reader may from hence see with what
 truth such imputations can be advanced. A
permanent assembly would, nay, must have made
 the government of France far more popular
 than that of England. But the object of modern
 Democratism is not *national liberty*: no, it
 is a liberty founded upon the most extravagant
 reveries of the most excentrical of the human
 species. But that they are *in general* actuated
 by the purest motives, it would be doing them
 a *great injustice* even to doubt.

Mr. Burke throughout his *Reflections* makes
 use of the term *Oligarchy* with singular propriety:
 not so the term *Aristocracy*: I mean, he
 does not use it in the same sense in which Aristotle
 would apply it; and it being a Greek term
 indicative of a certain kind of government, and
 introduced into our language for the same use,
 it strikes me, that not only it, but those other
 Greek or Latin terms distinguishing the other
 kinds of governments, should be used *precisely*
 in the same sense as by the Greeks or Latins.
 If the meanings of such important terms be not
 accurately defined, and constantly made use of
 in

in the same sense, it will be sometimes in vain to seek the author's meaning*.

But to return to Mr. Burke; in page 204, he supposes there are two sorts of Aristocracy; one by *descent*, the other the consequence of *wealth*. The first Aristotle would call, were it known in his time, an Oligarchy: *election* being the *essence* of Aristocracy; which proves that the English House of Lords is *not* an Aristocracy, as Mr. Burke says, p. 242, with almost all other writers, but an *Oligarchy*.

Page 257 Mr. Burke says, "a tyrannous Aris-

* The term *Aristocracy* is in general made use of by our English writers in the sense which the ancients affixed to the term *Oligarchy*. Except Mr. Mitford, in his History of Greece, and Sir William Young, in his History of Athens, I know of no other of our writers who uses the term *Aristocracy* in the same sense as the ancients. It surprised me that so accurate and elegant a writer as Doctor Symonds (See Young's Annals of Agriculture, vol. 13.) should call the political constitutions of Venice and Genoa *Aristocracies*, seeing that they are obviously Oligarchies: for though the governing councils in these states are *elective*, yet still they are elected from a *certain description of the inhabitants*, who hold the other inhabitants, though sometimes richer than themselves, far beneath them: and from which class these are for ever debarred, unless admitted by Co-optation.

“ tocracy,” it should be *Oligarchy* agreeably to his own use of this term.

Considering the important consequences which may result from our not having accurate and just definitions of the various terms indicative of the different modes of government, I hope I shall be excused for attempting to define them agreeably to what struck me during a careful perusal of Aristotle. The terms, Monarchy or Kingly Government, and Tyranny or Despotism, I have already defined p. 16, 19, so unnecessary to repeat; as also Aristocracy and Oligarchy, p. 17, 19. But since the time of this philosopher two sorts of Oligarchy have made their appearance; or, if mentioned in his *Treatise on Politics*, have escaped me. The first sort is when the Members of the Aristocracy become *hereditary governors*, as in the case of our Peers. The second sort is when the Members of the legislative council are *not* chosen out of *all* the citizens of the *same* degree of wealth, but from among a certain class. Those included under the appellation of *patricians* in the Roman Commonwealth were always aiming at this usurpation. It has been effected in the modern states of Venice, Genoa, and the Swiss Republics, as they are vulgarly, though improperly denominated; they are in fact strict Oligarchies, at least those of them of any consequence.

Aristotle's

Aristotle's favourite form of government, which he calls a *politeia*, is with great propriety rendered republic, being that form of government whose object was to preserve and defend the *just rights* of *all* its citizens : of the rich as well as the poor. As this is the object of every just government, then for a man to declare himself a *Republican* is only saying, that he is a favourer of that sort of government in which the rights and privileges of *all* are equally supported and defended. Yet this appellation, by being confounded with, or rather being held to be synonymous with that of *Democratist*, is become a term of reproach. But, now that its true genuine meaning is evinced, I hope that his Majesty will acknowledge himself, as every honest man should do, to be a Republican, according to its true genuine meaning. As such he will defend his own rights, the rights and privileges of the Peers, and also of the Commons—as such the Lords will defend their own rights, the rights and prerogatives of Majesty, and the rights and privileges of the people—as such the virtuous Commoner should defend his own rights and privileges, the rights and prerogatives of Majesty, and the rights and privileges of the Peers : and for this good reason, that the *justifying* government must be always supposed to

be the choice of the People. Neither will this opinion put a bar to improvements in our mode of government; it will only render it cautious and more difficult towards the reception of improvements, too often merely specious. In my apprehension his Majesty and the House of Lords, as having the greatest share in our government, are the most interested in bringing it to its utmost perfection. For, as Aristotle observes, the people being the foundation of all legitimate governments, if they become sensible that obvious improvements in our form of government are not adopted, because, forsooth, of the apprehensions, whether well or ill founded, of any individual or class of men, they would no doubt be justified in taking the business into their own hands. But it can not be supposed, that those individuals who will gain most by improvements in our political form of government will ever be the stiff opposers of them, which might endanger their exalted state. Neither should our reformers be too sanguine. From what I have observed from Aristotle, the greatest man that ever existed without comparison, it is evident, that our reformers are fundamentally wrong; and that our present government with all its defects, is, without comparison, superior to what they wish to substitute in its stead.

If

If what I have just observed be admitted, it follows, that the proper appellation by which the English government should be designated is *republic*; as being a form of government constituted for the defence and support of the just rights and privileges of *all* its citizens. This evinces the good sense of our antient writers, who always designate it by this title: and the ignorance of our antiquaries and lawyers who deny the propriety of it: and also of our Democratists, who, by this title, would gladly distinguish their own favourite form of government, which so far from having for its object the defence of the *just rights* of *each* class of citizens, has only that of the poor: for in every state the majority of the people must be poor; and in this form of government the majority becomes the ruling power. In fact, a Democracy, as Aristotle justly observes, is no other than a [many-headed] Despotism. For a Despot means, that the government is so vested in one person, as that he can manage the state, and act towards the individuals that compose it *ad libitum*; in like manner, as the master [Despotes] may act in regard of his chattels and slaves, there being nothing to controul him: if then the supreme power be vested in the people, there can be no check to prevent them from
 acting

acting agreeably to the present impulse : for a check in such cases to be effectual must needs be a paramount power ; so that the government would cease to be a Democracy.

That the lower classes of people should ever attain a sufficient share of wisdom or philosophy to entitle them to a share in the government, either directly or indirectly, is a notion perfectly romantic. To acquire either wisdom or philosophy requires leisure and reflection. But what will feed the poor man during his reveries ? I say this independently of the prior education which he should have received to enable him to generalize his ideas. So that the author of Ecclesiasticus was well founded in depriving the poor of all interference in the government, whether he was a Jew, or a Greek, as I believe him to have been. But whoever he was, he is supported in his idea by the wisest of the ancients ; Aristotle.

Aristotle observes, that it should be a chief object with government to take care that the *census* should be always sufficiently low, so as that those entitled to the rank and privileges of citizens should exceed in *wealth* those who would be excluded by it : for when they did not, seditions would inevitably arise in the state : for to separate wealth and power must
necessarily

necessarily be attended with this consequence : in like manner, that the *census* should be sufficiently high *only* to effect this : for were it much lower the *Politeia* or Republic would be changed into a Democracy : thus the perfect form of government lay between an Aristocracy and a Democracy, but nearer the former than the latter. Aristotle observes, that a breach in the census may happen by two ways : first by an influx of wealth, as happened at Athens in consequence of her victories over the Persians ; in-
 somuch that money had lost its former value : secondly, during the decline of a Commonwealth, for in this case money becomes of greater value. This I apprehend is a lesson for our English rulers ; and evinces, that the discontents which have prevailed among its most virtuous citizens for several years, are not the offspring of factious principles, but *necessarily* spring from property not having its due weight in our government. For, however respectable the Representatives of what are called rotten boroughs may be, yet their not being the Representatives of property has undoubtedly given rise to these discontents. Farther, when we hear of an Asiatic squad in the House, to what cause can it be imputed ? doubtless to the omnipotence of money in returning Representatives for parliament,

ment, and to the poverty or want of principle in the electors. But, were each Representative elected in the manner pointed out, this evil, if it exists, would be speedily rectified. For the constituents, men of proper age and reflection, and easy circumstances, would quickly recal the traitor. In like manner an unprincipled opposition, whose object was power, and to attain which scrupled not to throw every obstacle in the way of government, might perhaps, should ever such a case arrive, be disgracefully recalled, and replaced by others who would act more agreeably to the general interests of the nation.

I profess I am not sufficiently clear-sighted as to be sensible of the great advantages resulting from the unexampled publicity of our public transactions with other nations. It is a too common error in arguing to ascribe to wrong causes whatever happens in the moral world as well as in the physical : thus some impute to this our flourishing situation : as if there had never existed a flourishing state in which a strict secrecy was observed. Our flourishing situation is obviously the consequence of our enjoying a better political constitution than our neighbours, and the local circumstances of fertility of soil, and advantage of situation, &c.

Mr. Burke, p. 187, says with Lord Bolingbroke,

broke, “ that he prefers a Monarchy to other
 “ governments ; because you can better ingraft
 “ any description of republic on a monarchy,
 “ than any thing of monarchy upon the repub-
 “ lican forms. I think him perfectly in the
 “ right. The fact is so *historically* ; and it
 “ agrees well with the speculation.” I profess
 that my knowledge of history would induce me
 to make the opposite inference : as I do not re-
 collect a single instance of the republican form
 being ingrafted upon the monarchical ; but on
 the contrary, many of the latter upon the for-
 mer. It was so in the Cretan—it was so in the
 Lacedemonian—it was so in the Carthaginian
 Commonwealths, as we are assured by Aristotle.
 Farther, the Athenian Archons and the Roman
 Consuls were in substance temporary kings.
 Even in the English constitution kings were ori-
 ginally grafted or appointed by the National
 Assembly of the Chiefs, to enforce the general
 ordinances, or to lead the people forth in time
 of war. It is true, that since the introduction
 of *burgesses* into our House of Commons with the
 privilege of determining points concerning le-
 gislation and general policy, instead of confining
 their functions solely to assessing themselves,
 as was the first object of their introduc-
 H tion,

tion * there has been *grafting* upon our old monarchical Government a *Democracy*, which, unless guarded against by due provisions, but especially that most necessary one, the giving property its just influence, will in the end *overturn* not only the monarchical branch of it, but also the oligarchical, and establish in their stead a pure Democracy, which mode of government Aristotle † holds to be the next worst after a tyranny, and an Oligarchy. So that our reformers are aiming at a pretty sort of reform according to the wisest of the ancients. This is reforming backwards as my countrymen would say. A blessed reform forsooth! by which the populace and their demagogues, or those haranguers, who by humouring the propensities of the people to their ruin, as court-flatterers do with tyrants, would be enabled to tyrannize over, not the better class of people, as Mr. Burke renders the passage, but over the better men *εὐλογων* or the most virtuous citizens ‡.

I entirely agree with Mr. Burke in regard

* See Mr. Miller's Treatise upon the English Constitution.

† L. 4. Ch. 2.

Ib. Ch. 4. Reflection 186.

of the sovereign incapacity of the National Assembly to constitute a political Constitution for France: which is evinced from their regulations respecting the *mode* adopted by them for constituting national assemblies in future, which lays the rich at the mercy of the poor—from their regulations respecting the magistracy—from their regulations respecting the judicature—and in each of these they are likewise condemned by Aristotle, as has been seen.—Also, the folly of their conduct in regard of the army—and on finance, are perhaps without example. That they acted unjustly towards the clergy I think Mr. Burke has demonstrated—and that they have acted, and are acting insidiously towards their King, I mean the leaders of the Democrates, I entertain no doubt. That he is to be dethroned, or what is tantamount, reduced to a mere cypher, when the leaders of the Democrates will be able to take off the mask, requires little sagacity to perceive: and though I entertain no suspicion of the purity of the views of this party, that is, that their object is the happiness and prosperity of France; yet, as they have shewn their utter incompetency in the *means*, and as it cannot be expected, that they should be capable at once of altering their measures, nay, perhaps, that the people would not now consent to it, it

is my opinion, that his French Majesty, together with those of his friends, and those attached to regular government, should be ready and prepared to take advantage of every opportunity which may offer, of inducing the National assembly to accede to, or embrace the measure of *proposing to our King and Parliament the becoming a Member of the British Empire*. The difficulties which will shortly press on the French patriots, and which the sale of the King's domains and clerical property, though it should amount even to a sum equivalent to discharge the national debt, will not dissipate, must alarm a large portion of its Members, unaccustomed to face popular storms, and perhaps intimidate them, insomuch as to prepare them to go half way towards embracing the measure. *Slaves* have not that steady perseverance or virtue to enable them to controul or direct the storm. That there may be a few of the opposite character in this assembly, I will not dispute, though I much suspect it. But, admitting it, a great majority must undoubtedly be political cowards; and these will fetter the others, and prevent them from taking those decided steps necessary to victory. So that, if these leading characters have the wisdom of *the men of this generation*, they ought to prepare matters for such

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a wonderful, but beneficial revolution for mankind.

Mr. Burke appears to me to be materially wrong in simply recommending the English constitution, without any qualification, to the French revolutionists for their adoption. What! a political constitution, founded neither upon the solid basis of property, nor the fantastical one of population! Though, as already admitted, had the National Assembly done so, they would have acted more prudently than they have; nay, even that it would be their true-policy: nevertheless, to adopt a constitution founded upon neither property nor population, without any argument to evince the policy of such a measure, was not to be expected from Frenchmen; who, as just escaped from slavery, it might be foreseen, would be endowed with little foresight of its necessary consequence. As to the *Permanent Council*, of which Mr. Burke speaks, not having mentioned in what manner it was to be constituted, it is difficult to offer an opinion concerning it. But, if it was to be a *permanent organ of Liberty*, it is obvious that it would shortly reduce the kingly power to a mere cypher.

With regard to those who oppose Mr. Burke on the principles of *the rights of mankind*, by giving

ing the rights of election to all persons, which, though no better than beggars and vagrants, upon those principles cannot be denied to them, however convinced they themselves may be, I will take upon me to say, they will make few profelytes to their faith, among *Jobber-thinking* persons. This doctrine should be particularly grateful to master-manufacturers, for were our Representatives elected agreeably to this notion, they would be MASTERS in fact of the government of this kingdom and its dependencies : and even, as it is, their influence is immeasurably too great. They were the cause of the loss of America, and the scission of Ireland from this kingdom. Those gentlemen should further consider, that the authority of the greatest genius that ever existed, has in the most express language, not *once*, but *frequently*, declared himself against their theory ; who besides had far greater experience in matters of this nature, than what they can at all pretend to. The truth is, that all true patriots, and well-wishers of mankind should unite in placing our government upon the solid foundation of *property*, vesting far greater powers in his Majesty and government than what they actually possess ; they would thereby constitute a vigorous government, and by this means induce government itself to give its assistance towards

wards so desirable a change in both respects. Country gentlemen, who are generally farmers, though inimical to manifest injustice, are not fond of changes: these are only the object of agitated fanatical mobs, which can only exist in great cities, and be fostered by their employers, who should therefore be attended to, and deprived of political power. Neither could they complain with any justice; for in this case it might be answered, that from the limited faculties of man, it was impossible he could carefully attend to *two* objects *at the same time*; each of which demanded his whole attention; and therefore the complainant might right himself, did he think himself aggrieved, by giving up his trade, and commencing citizen, for that the constitution permitted no one to be, at the same time, a trader and a citizen.

I shall now proceed to a few observations upon Mr. Payne's pamphlet, intituled *the Rights of Men*; first premising, that in my apprehension, he has treated Mr. Burke in a manner that does not meet my idea of that respect and decorum, which his almost universally respected character—his private virtues—his acknowledged learning—and his age* demand. His being

* Mr. Payne, p. 31, informs us that the French *respect* age.

“ eaten up” with prejudices, should excite compassion, and not give rise to expressions, no doubt intended, to wound his too susceptible mind, such as “ flagrant misrepresentations,” “ an imposition ;” is it seemly to begin a work by engaging the passions before the judgment is convinced : again, “ real falsehoods,” “ *It suits his purpose* to exhibit the consequences without their causes. It is one of the arts of the drama to do so.” “ Where even probability is set at defiance for the *purpose of defaming, &c.*” Are such imputations decent, unless evinced in the clearest manner ? If Mr. Payne has attempted to substantiate one of them, it has escaped me. Mr. Burke’s French correspondent, who it may be reasonably supposed, was tolerably well informed upon the business, unless it also has escaped me, denies none of Mr. Burke’s facts. Can it be supposed, that if such epithets *truly* applied to Mr. Burke’s Reflections, that Mr. Depont would think of revisiting him on his return to this kingdom. Were he capable of such meanness, it would not be safe for him to be on civil terms, with the *Libeller* of his countrymen, upon his return to France. Perhaps it will be said, that Mr. Burke was unfounded in what he mentions of the mob exclaiming *the Bishops to the Lantern* on the 6th of October. Perhaps there were

were no such words made use of ; nevertheless, I cannot help thinking but that Mr. Burke was sufficiently justified in supposing that there were, upon the authority of Mons. Lally Tolendal : indeed Mons. Depont, withing to draw a curtain over the proceedings of that day, seems to me to justify every thing that Mr. Burke has advanced about it : as to the *bon jour* of the Mayor of Paris, I understood it in its obvious sense, the 6th of October, the day on which their Majesties' persons were secured, and the day on which they were spoken ; and I think it should be esteemed a *good day* by every Democratist.

That Mr. Burke should pay more attention to Mr. Lally Tolendal's letter from Paris, than to Mr. Payne's, is not surprising. We generally pay more regard to what those affirm, who think as we do, than to what those affirm who differ from us. For which reason, however unimpeachable the veracity of Mr. Payne may be, Mr. Burke's being guided in what he said, by the authority of Mons. Lally Tolendall, ought not to offend him.

Mr. Payne charges Mr. Burke with having changed his former sentiments, and it may be on account of this unknown pension, which it is said, Mr. Burke receives from the Irish establishment. Is a person to be condemned for a change

of sentiment ? Is truth less so when advanced by a pensioner ?—In fact, insinuations of this nature, when mentioned in controversy, evince that he, who makes use of them, feels that, however desirous, he cannot confute his adversary upon solid grounds. I would also wish to know, whether it be agreeable to Mr. Payne's system of Christianity, to cast a blot, or to repeat a malicious fact, to injure an unimpeached character. The view is obvious. Is it doing by others as we would be done by ?

Mr. Payne informs his readers that the French guards were *not* 3000 ; I understood that they were 4000 *—that there were only two or three persons killed at Versailles on the morning of the 6th of October ; I understood there were *seventeen* †. He also informs us that William the Conqueror, and his descendants, bribed with Charters one part of England, to hold the other parts of it the better in subjection to his will : I did not know before this *fact* of William the Conqueror : also that the county Rutland contains not the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of Yorkshire, or ten thousand persons : it may be so, but they appear to me to be very few. If

* Gent. Mag. vol. 59. p. 656. † Ib.

these two last assertions be unfounded, they ought not to have been introduced, as tending, more than the exact truth will justify, to promote the obvious tendency of the *Rights of Men*, namely, of making the inhabitants of this country dissatisfied with their political constitution. In every case the *precise truth* should be told, but above all, in cases of this nature : for though unfounded assertions will have their weight for a time, yet in the end, when the people have discovered them to be so, it detracts very much from what future assertors will advance, even though they should keep within the truth.

What Mr. Payne has said against Mr. Burke respecting England's being an hereditary crown *for ever*—and of governments arising *out* of a people to be *lawful* governments, and not *over* a people : appears to me unanswerable, and the latter ingeniously advanced. But I must deny the existing government of England to be of that sort. The barons in agreeing to accept of *Magna Charta* from King John had sufficient authority to bind the nation at the time : and such engagements are supposed to continue *for ever* : not but that the next or any future generation have it in their power to change it : yet,
until

until this is done the original settlement is supposed to subsist.

Mr. Payne has made a comparison between France and England with regard to *wealth*, and though, since Mr. Smyth's celebrated work of *the Wealth of Nations*, I thought that this subject could never be again misapprehended, yet from his giving to France the advantage in this respect can only be ascribed to this cause. However, let us examine what he has advanced. He admits that there are 20 millions of hard cash in England; and asserts that there are 90 and a half millions sterling in France, but for the sake of round numbers I shall make him a present of 3 millions and a half more: that is, I will allow that there are 100 millions sterling in France, or five times as much as there is in England. Admitting also, according to my computation, which some perhaps may think against my argument, that there are 16 millions of inhabitants in England, 20 millions sterling will be 25*s.* a head, full enough in all conscience to manage our internal commerce, the *real* use of money. Admitting also the inhabitants of France to be 30 millions, 100 millions sterling will be 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* or almost three times as much money per head there as in England:
and

and yet instead of France being richer, I affirm that she is without comparison poorer.

Doctor Smyth has informed us that money's-worth or manufacturers are equivalent to money. Now, when the wonderful magazines of every sort of commodity : the useful and superb furniture *every where* visible, our navy, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. are considered. Surely all these may be laid down at 1000 millions. French articles in the same line may be estimated, and perhaps highly too, at a fifth of this, or 200 millions, which, with the former 100, makes 10*l.* a head : whereas, by including manufacturers, &c. there is 68*l.* per head in England.

Mr. Payne also assures us that there was no national bankruptcy in France, but that the people had determined that they would not pay taxes. I do not chuse to doubt the word of a gentleman, yet I think it singular enough that Monsieur Depont acknowledges, that the sale of clerical property was that only which could prevent it.—It seems also that it was a secret to Mr. Neckar.—How comes it then that since the French Monarch has been dethroned, and has been re-installed by the pompous title of *the King of the French*, but in whose person it seems that this title is to commence and terminate,

nate *,—I say, how comes it that the taxes are even yet so defective, notwithstanding all the reforms? Is there a combination against paying taxes under the auspices of the National Assembly? Bad as our finances in England are I will venture to affirm, that she can bear taxes to the amount of 40 millions better than France can 20 millions, with all the clerical spoil and king's demesnes.

To prevent heedless persons being imposed on by sounds I shall here observe, that *wealth* with respect to nations is to be considered in three different respects: first, as the income of *Government*, this may be very great, and yet the people and nation very poor; thus let us suppose that Spain received annually from America 20 millions sterling. This vast sum would be quickly dispersed over the more industrious nations of Europe to purchase what the Spaniards want, little remaining in Spain: secondly, a *nation* may be rich and the inhabitants and government poor, as for instance, if there were 1000 millions sterling locked up in 1000 boxes in France, the *nation* would be rich but the government and people

* See Rights of Men, page 138.

poor, nor would it long continue to be otherwise were it even in circulation: thirdly, the *people* may be rich and yet the nation and government poor; this happens when the people are exceeding industrious and are *well-paid* for their labour. A nation like this is almost omnipotent; for unless you cut off their heads or hands, they will, like the Hydra, be ever reproducing the means of power. Whereas, if you get possession of the French boxes, or divide Spain from America, these two nations would be palsied, or rendered utterly impotent. This evinces the necessity and policy of giving every spur to industry, if a nation intends to be powerful; indeed as the French Democrates say, they will be content with drinking their wine under their own fig trees, which I will assure them will be the case, whether they were serious or not, it little matters what measures they take. I would despise myself were I capable of such a selfish thought. But for a nation of legislators, whose object should be to promote universal happiness, to harbour even for a moment such a base selfish idea should excite universal contempt and horror.

I would fain know from Mr. Payne whether he thinks it agreeable to *common sense*, that the government of a great nation should be put

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into the hands of ignorant, illiterate people, who know nothing of the matter? or whether he thinks it agreeable to the same principle, that by putting the government in the hands of the people at large, the majority of whom are in fact no better than the slaves of master manufacturers, that master manufacturers should be the governors or rulers of a mighty kingdom, who are ever inimical to every thing generous, and friendly only to monopolies, and what may serve their own short-sighted views? If Mr. Payne cannot answer these questions directly in the affirmative, he ought to give up his political creed. No argument from analogy, from America is admissible. There the people are almost all farmers or graziers: in France they are manufacturers or beggars. I therefore abide by my paradox, that the true interest of France, and I have the true interest of France as much at heart as Mr. Payne, is *to become a dependant portion of the British empire.*

As it appears that Mr. Payne is in considerable intimacy with many of the leaders of the French Revolution, it may be presumed that he is well founded in saying, p. 138, that “ In France
 “ it [the Monarchy] has so far declined, that
 “ the goodness of the man [the King of France]
 “ and the respect for his personal character are
 “ the

“ the only things that preserve the appearance
 “ of its existence.” Hence it is obvious that
 the Monarchical branch of the French constitution
 is to be annihilated. Were not this their
 intention, and now acknowledged by Mr.
 Payne, I had proposed shewing, that when
 the National Assembly severed the *Magistratical*
 from the *Executive* or Monarchical power, and
 had resolved, that the National Assembly should
 be a *permanent* body, that the annihilation of the
 Monarchical branch of the political constitution
 must necessarily be the consequence, which
 would be a farther proof of their sovereign inca-
 pacity, by making one branch of their constitu-
 tion destructive of another.

To recapitulate then the errors of the Na-
 tional Assembly, according to Mr. Burke, they
 consist,

First, in their mode of constituting their fu-
 ture National Assemblies, by which it will be
 only a mere ochlocracy, both from the shortness
 of its duration, and from almost all the people
 being constituents.

Secondly, in their regulations respecting the
 electing their magistrates, which will farther
 strengthen the Ochlocracy.

Thirdly, by *severing* the judges from the
 executive branch, by whom as being only *exe-*

cutive officers, they should be appointed and be *dependant* upon : and in these three he is supported by Aristotle, who has laid it down, that they are what a wise legislator should chiefly attend to.

Fourthly, in regard of their financial arrangements.

Fifthly, in regard of their conduct towards the army.

Sixthly, of injustice towards the clergy *.

Seventhly, of a want of generosity towards their virtuous and deserving King, who in fact proffered to them a better constitution than that which they have stumbled upon †.

With regard to the two last I apprehend that, in consequence of the Democratical principles universally prevalent throughout France, it was not in the power of the National Assembly after the 14th of July to have acted materially differ-

* By this I would not have it understood that I am not inimical to the present mode of provision for the clergy : on the contrary nothing I can deem more absurd, not only as defeating that good will and friendship which should subsist between pastors and their flocks ; but also as directly militating against great agricultural exertions, which should be peculiarly favoured by every wise government.

† See Gent. Mag. 1789, p. 654.

ent from what it did. Powers, vested in kings and bishops, depending on *opinion*, when this is destroyed, must necessarily fall with it. But the French King offered his constitution of government the 23d of June : the National Assembly is therefore inexcusable.

From what I have heard or read it does not appear to me that any one of Mr. Burke's answerers has attempted to repel any of the above seven charges : and until the *five* first are entirely done away, and that by arguments founded on experience, or on the assertions or writings of those who had experience, namely, the antients, those persons who pronounce themselves answerers of Mr. Burke should be only deemed *soi-disans* answerers.

I shall here add a few observations upon the turn of the debate which took place in both Houses of Parliament upon the delivery of his Majesty's message respecting our situation with other foreign powers, which will further evince the necessity of placing our constitution upon its true basis, the affections of the people, and of restoring the executive power to its constitutional vigour.

The two Secretaries of State, after delivering the King's message, required the support and confidence of their respective Houses of Parliament,
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in regard of those measures intended to be pursued, in case matters should not be accommodated with the Empress of Russia : but to their motions for this end an amendment in each House was proposed, intimating, “that until the honour and interests of his Majesty’s crown *shall* appear to be threatened, that they can *only* express their dutiful and loyal assurances of support.” If these amendments had been carried, it is evident, that his Majesty would have been deprived of the executive power ; for, till these two points had appeared to the satisfaction of each House, and of which each House would have been its own judge, his Majesty could have taken no steps whatever ; and thus we should have lost the advantages which ought to result from the energy of the monarchical branch of the constitution, and for which the nation pays a million annually. Besides, had the opposition succeeded, what foreign state would ever after venture to enter into any engagement with the executive branch, when there existed even a possibility of its not being able to effectuate its engagements, did either House of Parliament refuse its support to the measure ? Suppose that Parliament was as *venal* as some will have it, would not half a million, properly applied in either House, have secured a majority against

against

against the measure? And, though it required ten times the sum, who will deny, that the Czarina could have so well applied an equal sum. This strongly evinces the danger of giving either House of Parliament any pretext towards interfering with the executive branch of government. It is moreover a novelty in our constitution. The business and duty of the two Houses of Parliament, are to redress grievances, and make wholesome laws for their prevention, and arraigning Ministers for mal-practices, either with regard to squandering the public money, or censuring them for impolitic engagements with other states; but which, when once entered into, must be supported.

Mr. Fox is made to say by the reporters of these debates, that, upon the Czarina's usurpation of the Crimea, and the country between the Don and the Dnieper in the year 1782, the Ministry of that time, of which he formed a part, were applied to by the Count de Vergennes, to join with France and Spain, in obliging her to recede from so barefaced an usurpation, which was resisted. Independently of the want of political foresight, the first virtue of a Statesman according to Aristotle and all mankind, evinced by their resisting the proposition, and which would certainly not have been made by the French Ministry,

nister, did he not think it obviously for the advantage of England; this acknowledgement should not only exculpate the present Ministry from any unpopularity which may result from the expences of this war, but they should be placed to the account of Mr. Fox's Ministry. For, had that Ministry joined with France and Spain, in preventing Russia from enforcing her ambitious schemes, she would not have dared to bring down upon her our united forces: and thus would have been nipped in its bud the cause which has produced a very bloody war, and which is now likely to involve us in very expensive measures.

That it is the interest of Europe to prevent Russian conquests, especially on the side of Turkey, will be obvious to any one, who will look at the map of Europe. He will there see, if the Empress should effect her present ambitious designs against Turkey, that her territories on three sides would command Poland, for the Duchy of Courland may be said to be her's. Upon the demise then of the King of Poland, her *protege*, perhaps she may appoint another nominal King, it may be some very old man, upon whose death she might take immediate possession of Poland. The late Emperor of Germany

many would have supported her*, his object being to possess himself of the western part of Turkey in Europe, whilst she conquered the eastern; which effected, what could prevent his afterwards subduing the German Princes, who dare not interrupt his progress against the Turk, well knowing that he would be supported by a Russian army in possession of Poland, of 500,000 men. In this case; the northern kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark must submit to Russia without a blow, and become provinces of that empire, whilst the Emperor would be conquering the remaining part of the west of Europe, not excepting England herself. I entertain no doubt, but that the meeting of these two ambitious potentates some years ago at Cherson, was to devise some scheme of this nature, which, if successful, must have terminated in the subjection of Europe, and the management of which could not be entrusted to Ministers, lest happening to be in the pay of other powers, they might have divulged the secret, or imprudently entrusted it to a mistress. Effects must always have proportionate causes. It cannot be said that to

* Perhaps the present Emperor, if the discontents among his subjects did not prevent him.

be crowned *Queen of Taurida* could have been an object of any moment with so sensible a woman as the Czarina. And the same may be affirmed of the late Emperor.

Moreover, where there are two preponderating powers, it is the interest of the weaker, particularly in the naval department, to seek an alliance with the stronger; but not contrarywise: lest that, when the weaker, by means of the alliance, had been raised to a more formidable state, she should turn upon her old ally, and by forming other connections become the principal. This is precisely the situation between Russia and England, the actual preponderating European powers: and dictates to us, if we will suffer ourselves to be instructed by history, not to form any connection whatever with that power. Our avowed object should be to keep Russia down.

But what I would particularly call the attention of Englishmen to is, the sameness of complexion, which the arguments of the opposition bear to those advanced by the Barchine faction at Carthage, whilst Hannibal was ravaging Italy, and which, being followed, caused the ruin of that most flourishing republic. Some of our Senators dwell upon the weight of our taxes—Others wishing, or almost wishing suc-
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cess to our enemies—others depicting them as logs and as batteries, and whiskered Cossacks, as if Britons were to be terrified with such stuff. What the opinion of the King of Prussia was, concerning these dreadful Russians, is very clear from what he says, speaking of their victories over the Turks, that they resembled a man with *one* eye, fighting against another who had *none*. Mr. Burke, who has emphatically pronounced France to be a *Great Chasm*, is for introducing these Russians into the Black Sea, to assist us in our future wars against this chasm or *vacuum* and the Spaniards. When the abilities and experience of the gentlemen who make use of such arguments are considered, it evinces, what indeed is allowed by all, that an opposition or faction must always subsist in this government, and therefore that government must always be opposed with the best arguments, no doubt, that the nature of the case will admit of, and that the perfection of our constitution consists in the opposite interests of the component parts. I have ever thought, that the more the works of men resembled those of the Deity, which are harmony itself, the more perfect they were. Aristotle would have held a government of this sort as a proof of the extraordinary stupidity of its Members. His object was the harmoniz-

ing all the parts of his political constitution, by connecting with the other the interest of each class of the inhabitants.

There is another feature which peculiarly distinguishes our constitution from every other, namely, that our Senators scruple not to stigmatize with the foulest epithets, measures supported by government; nay, which have even been approved of by the House of Commons: for instance, the Indian war; both the policy and justice of which do not admit a doubt; and which even a respect for government should prevent every Senator, whatever he may think, from pronouncing unjust. Can it be supposed that the people will respect a government, or Houses of Parliament, whose measures are censured in so extraordinary a manner? Will not such language necessarily introduce a Democratical contempt of government? Can government subsist without the people's being impressed with a decent respect for its chief Members? But if the people are told, that government, his Majesty, and his Ministers, and the majority of both Houses of Parliament countenance *unjust* measures, how long will this decent respect subsist? Is not such language necessarily introductive of that French Democratical anarchy, which should be the dread of every enlightened mind? That Russia, in the present war

war between her and the Porte, is the aggressor, is most evident. In the year 1782 she possesses herself of the Cuban and the Crimea, and by the terror of hostilities, in conjunction with the Emperor, obliges the Porte to cede those provinces *by treaty*, the year after. This manifest injustice is the true cause of the war which was begun by the Turk, to repossess himself of these provinces *unjustly* wrested from him. The conduct of the Porte is fully justified by that of Carthage. Being in a very debilitated state after the war against her revolted mercenary troops, whom she had subdued, the Romans took possession of the island of Sardinia, and obliged her to yield it up from the dread of hostilities. This act of injustice, in the opinion of Mr. Hooke, justified the Carthaginians in recommencing hostilities against Rome ; and of course equally justifies the Porte in recommencing hostilities against Russia for the recovery of the provinces unjustly wrested from her.

As those of our Senators, to whose opinions I have alluded, are several of them very respectable characters, it is obvious, that a time may come, when, by means of Demagogues, and factious and seditious principles being propagated among the people, others, without principle, may be able to bridle the executive power,
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and even force themselves into government ; in which case they would be obliged to govern this powerful kingdom, agreeably to the prejudices of their creators, the mob : and be compelled to sacrifice its true interests to their shortightedness and selfishness. The power of the King to make peace or war would be wrested from him, under specious pretexts ; and vested in the people or their representatives. Then our leading men in either House, being in the pay of ambitious foreign states, and the people's mind kept in a flame by seditious paragraphs, would prevent, as in the case of Athens, with regard to Philip, our putting an effectual bar to their progress. The eloquence of Demosthenes was unequal to the flattering demagogues who were gained by Philip. At last his eloquence prevailed, but it was too late. The fatal battle of Chaeronea determined the fate of Greece. This period of history is an exact prototype of the present. Athens and Philip, as England and the Czarina—Pitt and the opposition, as Demosthenes and the demagogues*.

Aristotle

* I mean nothing disrespectful by this to the opposition. Phocion, whose private worth might stand a comparison with any

Aristotle has laid it down that when the power of peace and war is vested in a popular assembly, it necessarily leads to a dynasty or tyranny, who, independently of his sagacity, perhaps from his intimacy with Philip, had that of experience also, to direct him in condemning this power being lodged with the people, against whom it was turned by the enslaver of Greece. However, notwithstanding what Aristotle has laid down upon this head, which history also confirms, Mr. Payne, without even noticing it, with other Democrates, contends for vesting this power in the people or their creatures.

To put an end to faction, and to restore the executive branch to its *constitutional* energy, government should take the most effectual and speedy measures, in order to vest the *elective* power in the hands of those, whose wisdom is matured—whose ambitious projects are nearly extinguished—and who cannot be biassed by private views; that is, in those persons who sup-

any man in Britain, was a firm opponent of Demosthenes. I also consider her, Mr. Pitt, and Demosthenes only as Statesmen. As an Orator no man having ever approached the latter. Mr. Pitt must however be allowed to be the ablest and closest reasoner that ever spoke in the House of Commons.

port themselves without following fordid trades or illiberal professions; and who have arrived at their *fiftieth* year. Our Members of Parliament being elected by such men, and being *dependent* on them, would not dare to enter into factious conspiracies; but on the contrary our Representatives would be obliged diligently to attend to their duty, by enacting wholesome laws, and redressing those grievances which must necessarily spring up in every government. The one half of our representatives to be elected *viva voce*, the other *by suffrage*; and a Censorial Council of one hundred for the regulation of manners, but chosen by the citizens. This effected, his Majesty, independently of the honest satisfaction of being handed down to posterity with the Numas, Solons, Lycurguses, Alfreds, and other benefactors of mankind, might almost say, that he left to his posterity an *everlasting* kingdom.

Nothing can be more certain than that there *must* be a change in the form of our government, for in its original constitution, there was no provision made against those consequences which must ever result from the alterations and changes of property in its constituent branches. For instance, the revenue of the crown is fixed at a million annually: let us suppose that of the
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Lords at two millions : and both these to have been so at the revolution, when perhaps the annual income of all the citizens and people amounted not to more than 50 millions : but whatever the amount of it might be *then*, it is undoubtedly five times greater *now* : but as property follows wealth, their Representatives should have *now* five times more weight in the constitution than they had *then*, when compared to the income of the King, if this has not proportionably encreased, and also the same with regard to the Lords, if their income has not also proportionably encreased. Now that the King's income and that of the Lords have not proportionably encreased with that of the people, is an obvious and incontrovertible truth, which evinces, that the balance in our constitution is destroyed : and that therefore it behoves government, according to Aristotle, and not the people, according to the demagogues, to restore the original balance, which is impossible, as this would require the creation of five hundred Lords, which the people would not bear, or to devise another form of government; for otherwise it is clear, that the people will take the business into their own hands, and follow the example of the French revolutionists, than which a greater misfortune could not happen to the nation. As his Majesty and

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the Lords, and wealthy Commoners, would in this case be the greatest sufferers, so they should be most urgent in the business, as in a little time it will be too late. For, independently of the democratical principles, which have been propagating these thirty years in Britain, and which have taken such possession of the minds of the people, as not to admit a doubt but that the majority lean strongly to democracy, the success of the American colonies, and the late French revolution, must so increase their numbers and courage, as to preclude every doubt of their final success. As men of this cast, from their inexperience, and goodness of heart, are generally presumptuous, and entertain no doubt of escaping or avoiding those rocks upon which their prototypes have struck.

Aristotle's excluding from the rights of citizenship, so many of the inhabitants as would come under the description of *buyers* and *sellers*, besides those who support themselves by their labour, will in this age of the *Rights of Men*, appear very extraordinary, unjustifiable, and impolitic. However, a little reflection will shew the propriety of their exclusion. For, concerning the poorer class, who know nothing of government. nor ever can have any idea of it, to vest in them the rights of citizenship, would be only making them

them the tools of artful, designing, selfish men, either master-manufacturers, other employers, or demagogues ; by whose means laws would have only temporary objects in view. Such governments, besides, have ever been inimical to truly virtuous and good men, whom the populace, instigated by designing individuals, and prompted by momentary passions, have frequently most miserably put to death, which they afterwards sorely repented of ; when they had discovered that those endeavours which had made them obnoxious, were solely directed for their benefit, by exposing the arts of their masters, employers, and demagogues. Secondly, with regard to buyers and sellers, or manufacturers, besides their not having the necessary leisure for reflection, and for considering the effect which may result from ordinances relating to government, they would be ever guided by selfish motives, establishing monopolies, and regulating trade, the price of provisions, &c. &c. which have never produced any good to the community at large : but on the contrary much evil. But by vesting the right of citizenship in those who live upon their income, or follow liberal professions, their interest being that their incomes should go as far as possible, it would be always a spur to them for

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devising

devising schemes for promoting manufactures and the arts, in order to have them cheaper.

Secondly, by raising the value of the products of their estates, which would be most effectually done by raising such a spirit of competition among those engaged in trade, manufactures, agriculture, and commerce, as to enable them to afford to the great body of the poor, the consumers, the greatest possible daily wages consistent with honest profit, and this could only be done by equally protecting the rights of all; but especially by permitting every person to dispose of the products of his industry *when* and to *whom* he pleased, and supplying his wants in like manner. By this simple arrangement, or rather doing of nothing, the value of labour would be encreased, which would enable the poor to give greater prices for the products of the soil, and each class would take care not to lose the home market. Thus, the interest of all would be in unison, which was doubtless intended by our all-wise and benevolent CREATOR.

F I N A N C E.

ARISTOTLE observes*, that in estimating the greatness of a State, the number of its inhabitants should not be so much considered, as its power (*δυναμεις*) or wealth, which would enable it to annoy its enemies with effect, by affording an ample revenue from taxation. As in those days the same takes place in ours. That country which, *cæteris paribus*, has the greatest revenue, or the greatest resources, is reckoned the most powerful. It therefore behoves every state to consider those means by which, without oppressing its subjects, the greatest revenue can be levied from them. Neither should subjects repine at the greatness of the annual public income: for, independently of the greater protection and security which they would thereby enjoy, it might be so employed as to infuse a peculiar energy and force of character throughout the whole nation.

* L. 7. c. 4.

It is an obvious truth, that the farther any tax is laid from the consumer, or the person who in fact pays it, the heavier it falls upon him : for instance, a tax upon malt of five shillings a bushel, will be paid by the maltster to the revenue officer : when the brewer or distiller buys this malt, he will not only pay for the malt the price it would be at were there no tax at all upon it, but also the five shillings *advanced* by the maltster to the revenue officer ; and also a *premium* to the maltster for having *advanced* it, which we may suppose to be ten per cent. on these five shillings : this adds sixpence to the five shillings : the brewer in selling his beer to the retailer will likewise expect a premium or interest for the five shillings and sixpence which he has *advanced* to the maltster above the value of the malt, which will make the tax six shillings on the bushel of malt ; in like manner the retailer when selling it to his customers, the real consumers, will likewise have his premium of ten per cent. for having *advanced* to the brewer six shillings beyond the value of the price of the product of a bushel of malt, had there been no tax on it ; thus the tax which government receives, though only five shillings, is six shillings and seven-pence half-penny upon the *consumer*, or upwards of thirty per cent.

cent. above what he would pay, did he make his own malt, and brew his own beer.

There are two obvious evils attending this mode of taxation ; first by making the people pay more than government receives, it impoverishes them, and even thus lessens the revenue by disabling the subject from expending upon exciseable commodities, that money which he now pays to those persons who have advanced the taxes for him ; namely, the maltster, brewer, and retailer : and secondly, those persons who are accustomed to advance the taxes, are ever engaged in contriving means by which they may avoid paying the tax, in which they frequently succeed, even to such a degree as to defraud the revenue to the amount of millions : nevertheless, they will not sell their beer or spirits a farthing the cheaper in consequence of their fraud : so that the consumer is obliged to buy his beer and spirits at the same price, that he would have done, had they paid the regular duty. But, moreover, he must make up, by means of *other* taxes, for the defrauded millions, which further disables him from purchasing exciseable commodities ; and thus the public income is further considerably lessened. However, this mode of taxation, though in many cases the consumer

sumer pays fifty per cent. more than what government receives, is persevered in by it, as the people pay the taxes, seemingly without being sensible that they pay any : whereas, were they sensible that the sugar which they buy at eightpence a pound, might be purchased at fourpence were there no taxes, and several other articles in the same proportion, it is not improbable, but that petitions might be laid before Parliament from the Poor, demanding an alteration in the mode of taxation, by which not only themselves, but even the whole community, are so materially injured.

However, *as it needs must be, that taxes must be paid*, it perhaps may not be improper to consider, whether any new ones can be devised, which may be substituted in the stead of some of those actually subsisting; for, till this be done, little attention will, or should be given to the prayer of such petition. I have already given a scheme for substituting other taxes in the stead of those which actually exist, and though I am satisfied, that what I have already proposed, is preferable to those which actually do exist, yet I am not one of those persons who is so eager with his schemes, as to think that government should materially alter her system of taxation, even in the smallest particular,

ticular, except upon very plausible grounds indeed. Yet this should not deter the patriotic citizen from offering his sentiments upon a subject, which if rightly hit upon, would so materially contribute to the prosperity and happiness of his country.

In the tract alluded to*, I proposed grain and butcher's meat, as fitter objects for taxation than those upon which our taxes are now levied. In proposing a tax on grain, in preference to the meal produced from it, which might be more easily collected at the mills, my view chiefly was, *indirectly* to tax horses: however, by farther reflection on the subject, I think I can lay a tax on the horses *directly*, which if properly attended to, will not be easily evaded. I am far from thinking that taxes on grain, or the meal of grain, and on butcher's meat, are ineligible; yet still, as they would in some degree embarrass trade, which, except in pernicious commodities ought to be as free as the winds of heaven, for this reason I think such taxes ought, if possible, to be avoided. In Holland there are taxes on both these commodities, so that there is no impossibility in levying

* First Letter to the People of England.

them : and certainly government would be less liable to be defrauded by butchers and millers, than by smugglers, brewers and distillers.

Instead of those taxes I would propose first, an annual tax on horses, to the amount of the *medium value* of two loads of hay in the city or town where they stood, or to the next market town. By this means the tax would be pretty nearly proportioned to the earnings of the horse throughout the kingdom ; for, as subjects of taxation, all horses should be deemed labouring ones. In London such a tax would amount to about six pounds six shillings ; in the north of Scotland, perhaps not to more than a fourth of this sum, or one pound eleven shillings and six-pence. However, I think there should be a distinction made between horses employed in husbandry, and horses kept in great cities for luxury, and those kept solely with a view to productive labour. I would therefore farther propose, that those persons who kept *five* times as much land in their hands as was necessary to support the horses they kept, should be only charged at the rate of *one* load of hay. Besides favouring the farmers by such a regulation, my object would also be to induce country gentlemen to continue such. For there can be no doubt but that this class of citizens are the most useful of all others. Farther, as there are many
poor

poor people, who cannot do without *one* horse, particularly in Ireland, for bringing home their fuel and other purposes; and as perhaps the same is the case in Wales and Scotland, and the mountainous parts of England, I would reduce the tax to such occupiers of land, who held in their possession *five* times more land than was requisite to support a horse, to the price of *half* a load of hay.

What would be the amount of a tax of this nature, were it fairly collected, is very difficult to say. England, Wales, Scotland, and their dependent islands contain about seventy millions of acres: that there is a horse to every thirty-five acres, cannot be disputed. Let the reader only consider the numbers of horses, which are kept in London, and all the great towns, nay, I may say, all the little towns also, throughout England, and he may be able to form an idea of their number; when he at the same time considers, that perhaps there is not a farm of thirty-five acres in England which has not *one* horse on it; nor a farm of seventy acres which has not *two*: to say then that there are two millions of horses in Great Britain and its dependent islands, will most certainly be under the mark. I shall however take it at this. For many reasons, which are only founded upon probability, and

therefore would prove nothing, I am inclined to think that the *medium* tax upon horses would be about 4*l.* or the total amount of such a tax eight millions.

While our present prejudices subsist a tax on horses ought to be popular, when it is considered, that they are very generally objects of luxury ; and besides, that a middle-sized horse requires as much land for his support, as, if well cultivated, would yield not a scanty subsistence for one poor family ; so that our two millions of horses, if thoroughly fed, would require as much land for their maintenance as would perhaps support ten millions of inhabitants. I say, that all taxes laid on with a view of particularly bearing upon any description of men, but particularly the rich, are founded upon prejudice ; and that those legislators, who give into notions of this nature, act as wisely as the man who killed the hen which laid the golden eggs ; and unjustly too ! For, when men entered into society, or formed the social compact, it was certainly understood by all the parties, that each of them should be answerable towards the expences consequent thereto, *proportionably* with the rest. Let us now suppose, that the social compact was entered into at first by ten persons, and that the expences amounted

annually

annually to the value of ten bullocks, or a bullock each person. Let us also suppose that in consequence of war, or a pursuit of plunderers, that there is an extraordinary expence incurred to the amount of ten bullocks, how is it to be liquidated? one of them might say, we must each of us give a bullock extraordinary. Let us suppose that this person was a smoker of tobacco, and that he cultivated this plant to a large extent, and supported himself chiefly by the sale of the produce: should the other nine persons say no, to his proposal, and at the same time insist upon laying a tax of 3*d.* a pound upon his tobacco, he must needs yield; but that he had been dealt unjustly with is very obvious. The same argument will apply when taxes are laid upon manufacturers, shop-keepers, &c. for to say that consumers pay the tax does not do away the objection; as it is obvious, that the cheaper any commodity can be sold at, the more of it will be purchased, and of course the greater will be the *honest* profits of the persons who deal in it, and thus the *craft* or calling of such persons is indirectly and unjustly taxed. As this is clear with regard to manufacturers, shop-keepers, &c. it is equally obvious, that, by laying taxes upon those who live upon their income, you lay a bar upon their consumption, upon which the
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riches and power of the state are founded. But what is still worse, you thereby inducethem to quit their native land, and remove to other countries, where their incomes will enable them to maintain themselves genteelly. So that by this means not only the industry of the community is lessened, but also the public revenue.

That there exists an inclination in government for taxing horses pretty smartly, cannot, from some late regulations, be at all doubted; but the difficulty is to discover the means to prevent the proprietors of horses evading the tax. To effect this, I would propose that every horse in the kingdom (except perhaps those belonging to the royal family) should, under the penalty of forfeiture, be marked on the hind quarter with a circle of a colour the most opposite to that of the horse, to be worn from the first of August, 1791, to the thirty-first of July of the year 1792. The owner of each horse, upon its being marked should be obliged to pay the tax; and at the same time receive a stamped *sheet* of paper containing a receipt for the tax; in which paper the future annual taxes should be *only* entered. Farther, this paper should contain an accurate description of the horse; and in case he should change masters, this paper should be given to his new master,

master, under the penalty of a sum equal to every annual tax since the commencement of the act to be levied upon the person in whose possession he was found. Farther, that all horses, &c. under the age of *four* years old should be in like manner annually marked and registered, but to pay no tax, except the value of the paper or a sixpence, till they had entered upon their fifth year. A copy of the deed to be entered in the collector's book of each district. Farther, any horse appearing with a forged mark, should, upon proof, be forfeited. Though perhaps some horses might evade the tax, yet in a few years there can be no doubt, but that the number of these animals would be pretty accurately known; for the breeders of them would not risk their property by not having them *annually* registered, when it would cost them so little.

∴ The second tax which I would propose is a capitation tax, to the amount of the value of twelve days work of a labouring man where the person taxed resided, upon every person, except labourers, (who should not be obliged to pay this tax for more than three children,) under the age of fifteen. This is the only tax which the poor would have to pay; and though in Middlesex, and the parts adjacent to London, it would amount annually to about 5*l.* 5*s.* per family of
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five persons, and in the north of Scotland to perhaps 33s. or 34s. yet I will venture to affirm, that in neither place would it be an oppressive tax, but on the contrary much less burdensome than those complex taxes which they actually pay without it seems being sensible of them. A poor man and his family in the vicinage of London earn about 50*l.* a year. Let us suppose that the half of this income is expended in purchasing articles excised, or which have paid the customs to the amount of 6*l.* This 6*l.* having been advanced for them by several becomes 9*l.* upon the consumer, as has been shewn, and generally a great deal more: but 9*l.* wants but little of the double the proposed tax; independently of the considerable advance of price, our excises and customs must cause upon our own manufactures, which should also be reckoned, and which, when added to the former, must undoubtedly more than double the proposed tax.

Farther, it is a well-known fact that mechanics pretty much throughout England, lose one day in the week in consequence of their excesses, upon receiving the amount of their week's labour. Now if instead of losing, in so beastly a manner, fifty-two days in a year, they applied themselves to their trades, the amount of these fifty-two days

days labour would pay the capitation tax, both for themselves and for their families, when not exceeding *five* persons: for in every trade the labour of a mechanic is higher than that of a labourer in the same place.

In the north of Scotland and those parts of the kingdom in which wages are low, and where the demand for labour is uncertain, and where of course the labourer might be distressed for money to answer the tax, in such places the labourer should have his option of paying either in cash or in kind. In this case he should be billeted upon some farmer, or other substantial person, who should be responsible for his and family's capitation tax.

From what Mr. Bushe has laid before the public, who is one of the most accurate and best informed men in Ireland upon financial subjects, as I have heard, for I do not know the gentleman, it appears, that there are *at the least* four millions and a half of inhabitants in Ireland, which is my own opinion and that of every sensible person of my acquaintance, who has turned his thoughts upon this subject and is at all acquainted with the kingdom. Now, being at least as well acquainted with England, in this respect, as I am with Ireland; and having made many enquiries upon the subject,

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I hesitate not to affirm, that if Mr. Bushe is accurate in his statement of the inhabitants of Ireland, that this island and its dependencies, which are considerably more than *three* times as large as Ireland, contains eighteen, or *at the least* sixteen millions of inhabitants; my reasons for which the reader may see in the tract alluded to, p. 97. Though I am confident, that there are actually eighteen millions of inhabitants in this island and its dependencies; yet on the present occasion I shall only state them as at sixteen millions. If then we take the daily wages of a labourer at one shilling a day as the medium, the capitation tax at 12s. a head will amount to the sum of 9,600,000*l.* To these add the land tax 2,000,000*l.* and an equal sum by means of duties on spirits and incidents, we have a sum total of 19,600,000*l.* annually; deduct for collection 600,000*l.* there will remain nineteen millions, or three millions more than our present multifarious system of taxation produces. To prevent evasions in the capitation tax, it would be necessary to enter the name and age of each person in a registry: and that each person should have a deed of his registry ready to produce, or if children, their parents; and in other respects

as observed in regard of the four-legged animals *.

I would also propose a tax of *ten* shillings a quarter on all wheat imported into this kingdom, and *five* shillings a quarter upon all other grain. This would yield, *communibus annis*, upwards of 200,000*l.* if we may be allowed to form an inference from the *account of the quantity of corn and grain, exported from, and imported into, England and Scotland, for eighteen years, from the 5th of January, 1770, to the 5th of January, 1789, &c.* signed John James Catherwood, Receiver-general

* This argument concerning population can be reduced to a small compass. Ireland, omitting fractions, is supposed to contain nineteen millions of acres, English measure, and, according to Mr. Bushe, four millions and a half of inhabitants, or something lower than one to every four acres and a half. England is supposed to contain forty-one millions of acres, and if equally populous as Ireland, should of course contain 9,666,666 inhabitants: but that it is half again as populous as Ireland I have shewn I think in the tract alluded to: to the 9,666,666 then we are to add 4,833,333 which makes the population of England 14,499,999; add two millions and a half for Scotland and Wales, we have then seventeen millions for the population of Great Britain and its *dependencies*. But England is more than one half again more populous than Ireland.

of the corn-returns, inserted in the 13th volume of the *Annals of Agriculture*.

	Quarters.	s.	£.	s.	d.
Wheat imported during these eighteen years	2,716,293	at 10	= 1,358,146	10	—
Barley — 864,867	6,960,869	at 5	= 1,740,214	15	—
Oats — 5,245,300					
Rye — 280,398					
Beans and Peas 570,304					
Bounties during that space	—	—	597,583	6	4 $\frac{3}{4}$
			<u>3,695,944</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4$\frac{3}{4}$</u>

which amounts to an annual loss to the public, had such a tax existed during this time of 205,330*l*. And though many will think, that the great import during this space was owing to a failure of crops, yet I make no doubt, but that it was owing to the encreasing population of the people, and to the superior profits which result from applying land to the dairy and fattening cattle, in a thriving country in which the people are daily becoming richer, and are of course better able every year to purchase meat for their families consumption, which must necessarily raise the price of butcher's meat, and which will continue so to do, if the nation continues in its present state of prosperity. Farther, a tax of this nature would only put the English farmer upon

upon a par with the French and American farmers in our own market : for the former being exempted from tythe, and the latter from tythe and rent, will otherwise be able to undersell English farmers in their own markets : which must greatly discourage the raising of grain in this kingdom, and make it too dependant for its subsistence upon foreign countries, the climates of which are not so much to be depended on for the usual returns at harvest as England : and whose cultivators have not the ability, equal to that of our own farmers, of counteracting by their skill the effects of unusual seasons. Besides a fixed tax of this amount would keep our markets more upon a level, than our present corn laws ; which is a circumstance always very desirable, and I am inclined to think would not even raise them. It is needless to observe that the bounty upon the exportation of corn should be entirely discontinued.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE POOR.

ARISTOTLE* observes that the employment of the poor ought to be a principal concern with every state; and there can remain no doubt concerning this, if it be the object of the state to be great and powerful: for these depend, or rather are the consequence of the income of the state; which depends on the income of the individuals which compose it; and if a great number of these have no employment, the produce of their industry being nothing, will materially affect the sum total of the income of the individuals belonging to the state, and of course its power. This may be readily exemplified by considering the actual state of France, which is said, and I believe, with very good reason, to contain thirty millions of inhabitants: of these thirty millions, I will undertake to say that there are ten millions of idlers, or two millions of families. Those persons who have travelled

* L. 6. c. 5.

through France, must have perceived, almost every where the people employed in playing at bowls, or some other amusement, without any apparent tie upon them for regular labour. Now, if the sum total of the earnings of a poor man and his family ought to amount to twenty pounds annually, it will follow that this idleness causes a loss to that state of forty millions annually; if we place it at thirty pounds, the loss will then be 60 millions. Many will think that this sum is impossible, and far *above* the truth; but the fact is, that it is *far below* the truth. For independently of the universal idleness perceptible throughout France, it follows from their very poverty that they are incapable of purchasing the proper tools, or good tools to carry on their trades. So that if a man, in consequence of the badness of the instruments he works with, can only accomplish the *half* of what he could otherwise do, such a person may be said to be only *half* employed. Perhaps it may be objected, that admitting their industry to be as great as I would have it, where is the *specie* to be found, capable of purchasing thirty millions worth of manufacture? Doubtless no where. But the case is this; were the agriculture and manufactures, &c. of France, which are at present carried on by thirty millions, equally well done by twenty millions,

millions, which is my hypothesis, ten millions of its inhabitants might apply themselves to other new branches of manufactures, &c. These would exchange their manufactures with the others, either directly by means of barter, or indirectly by means of coin. Here then would be two new markets, we may say created; one of ten millions for the *old* manufactures, the other of twenty millions for the *new* manufactures; besides what would be necessary for their own consumption. In this case it is obvious that each party would exert every nerve to supply the others with what they wanted; this would lead to improvements in their modes of manufacturing, and thus enable them to sell cheaper, and at the same time to have greater profit; hence both parties would be enriched; the consequence of this would be, that they would like to be fed better, and of better things too. The butcher instead of having half a dozen customers, would have ten times as many, who would therefore raise the price of his meat: the farmer upon this would raise the price of his cattle, and at the same time would be contriving schemes to enable him to support more of them; thus agriculture would be rendered more flourishing. The government perceiving the increasing wealth and prosperity of the people, would be devising means

means of securing part of the overplus to itself, in order that the people which it ruled might be respectable in the eyes of other nations. This overplus, either in kind, or in money, would be employed in paying fleets and armies, and in liquidating national debts. Hence it is obvious that the industry of all is the benefit of all; and that the first object in every society, after constituting a political constitution, should be, to encourage industry, nay to enforce it, as immediately tending to the prosperity of all its members, and in regard of its governors adding materially to their political consequence, with respect to other communities.

To propose any thing on this head, as likely to turn out advantageous to England, might be deemed presumptuous, especially in a stranger, who professes that whatever just ideas he may entertain on this subject are entirely owing to those observations which obtruded themselves upon him in his frequent peregrinations through it. And, however applicable some of them may be in his opinion to England, he apprehends that this notion will be found to be grounded upon his imperfect idea of it. But with regard to Ireland he will speak more positively.

In the first place he thinks, that it is evidently the interest of Great Britain, that the inhabitants

of these three kingdoms should, with regard to those advantages which result from a wisely constituted civil community, be put, as soon as possible, upon an equal footing: that is, that all their inhabitants should participate, as soon as might well be, of those advantages which some of them now enjoy. Until this is done, even though the political constitution should be founded upon property, the state would not be free from sedition, and heartburnings. That a well-informed government could object to any measures necessary to facilitate this object, which would materially tend to its own power, is not to be imagined. That short-sighted selfish manufacturers might raise a clamour is very natural. However, the true interest of the empire, firmly and pertinaciously adhered to by an intelligent Ministry, would quickly put an end to such murmurings. The most effectual means of attaining this very desirable end, I apprehend would be the securing, the home market for her manufactures, to each of the appendant kingdoms, at least for those manufactures, which it would be found adviseable *peculiarly* to encourage; either because of the staple being the natural growth of the country, or
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that they could be carried on in them at all times upon equal terms, as in any other countries. This I think might be effected by means of premiums, or bounties of twelve per cent. upon all piece manufactures sold in public market, and at the same time so *marked*, that they could not be without detection, (which should be attended with a forfeiture of the goods) a second time proposed, as being entitled to the premium. The premium of course would be paid to the manufacturers. So considerable a premium, and ensured for a number of years (suppose twenty) would cause many of those individuals, who possess one, two, or three hundred pounds, and who lend it at six per cent. interest, to some neighbouring gentleman, shopkeeper, or attorney, to reflect and consider how much more their capital would produce, were it applied to manufactures, independently of its greater security: besides that such application of it would require little of their attention, nay, might be almost entirely directed by their wives and daughters. That such was the origin of the great increase of the cotton manufactures at Manchester, I know from the manufacturers themselves; and that some who began with one and two hundred pounds capital, carry on the business now with ten and twenty thousand

pounds capital. However, according to our modern legislators, the mode should be to pay premiums to the merchants on exportation, which no doubt would have its effect ; but not the tythe of that which would result from premiums to the manufacturers themselves. For these having only in view production, are ever devising modes by which the greatest quantity of goods can be produced with the least labour, which when effected in any degree, is of universal advantage. But this is no object with the exporter. His object is the quantity of goods exported, no matter to him the quantity of labour bestowed upon them : for his gains are the same. Add to this the diffusing wealth throughout a country, by encouraging the manufacturer : whereas by encouraging the merchant, you give rise to some overgrown upstart, who is incapable of supporting with dignity, a situation which nature seemed to have denied to him.

Agriculture, which though upon every account, should be the first object of society to encourage, as producing the best and most useful citizens, yet in consequence of our ill-founded prejudices on the side of manufactures and commerce, and a corresponding conduct, can only be *now* looked upon in a secondary light, at least till communities recover their natural

tural tone, ought, in regard of Ireland to be encouraged in the following manner. One object should only engage the attention of the Dublin Society at the same time. As I should give my vote for turnips, I shall suppose that the one fixed on. The premium on this species of production should be as follows. First the kingdom should be divided into *fifty* divisions, nearly equal as to superficies; in each division there should be *one* person appointed for conducting the experiment and receiving the premium. This person to be appointed by the citizens, or those possessing independent *life estates* within the district; the premium should be 200*l.* a year for ten years, upon his engaging every year, during that term, to have twenty-five Irish plantation acres, properly hoed, according to the most approved English manner: two years premium to be advanced to him upon his appointment, that it might not disarrange his private affairs; and to enable him, without inconvenience, to carry it on with effect. Perhaps the importing two or three English hoers from Norfolk or Suffolk might be necessary; to do which, with the necessary implements, would require money. It is needless to observe, that ample security ought to be insisted on for the due performance. By this means there would
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distributed throughout the kingdom fifty turnip farms, and of course convenient for the inspection of all persons who chose to adopt this species of cultivation. The sum requisite would be 10,000*l.* for ten years, or 100,000*l.* Though this must be allowed to be a great sum, yet, when it is considered, that an equal sum has been annually given in bounties, I believe for thirty years past, without producing any effect, in consequence of the Dublin Society's embracing too many objects, which from their triflingness could never be attended to ; a sum of this magnitude should not be regarded, when the manifest object of it was to increase the quantity, and so diminish the price of a necessary article of life. Were it also observed in the instructions given to each of the persons appointed, that perhaps the most certain beneficial mode of applying land after turnips, upon burn baiting, would be, second, potatoes ; third, wheat ; fourth, clover ; fifth, wheat ; sixth, turnips : seventh, potatoes, wheat, clover, wheat, *da capo* ; a good system of husbandry might be introduced. Every man in Ireland knows the value of an acre of wheat and potatoes ; and though there might be other rotations of crops more beneficial, perhaps few would be more easily introduced. By this means a general opulence would take place
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among the people, who would thereby be enabled to purchase, what many of them seldom do more than three or four times in the year, good beef and mutton ; these articles of course would proportionably rise in value, and estates with them. The people being employed, and feeling the advantages of industry, would change their character, and instead of defacing the country by stealing timber, would become protectors of that property which contributed so much to the beauty and neatness of their little holdings. So that, though the taxes might at first be pretty high upon gentlemen, yet in the end they would be infinitely the greatest gainers ; besides the unspeakable satisfaction of immediately contributing to the comfort of so many poor wretches, with which the country abounds.

To obviate many inconveniences which result from prospects of war, I would propose that thirty regiments of a thousand men each should be immediately raised in Ireland. These thirty thousand men, instead of being employed in acquiring the military discipline, should on the contrary be employed on the public works. The first of which should be a general draining of the kingdom, by deepening the beds of rivers, and removing other obstructions in them. I will take upon me to say, that such a body of
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men employed on this work for five summers, or twenty months, would add to the annual rental of land two millions sterling, without any farther improvement. But when this was effected the millions of acres which might be watered, and were so, would be encreased in value threefold; which improvement they will never be susceptible of till the first is effected. Neither can the first be effected without its being undertaken by government, for it is not to be supposed that there is a single river or stream in the kingdom which does not touch the property of some foolish, or mulish, or *selfish* fellow, who would defeat the entire scheme with regard to it. Perhaps it would be necessary to pull down some eel wires, but this should be little regarded, as the erecting them was an encroachment upon public right: and no man should be a gainer by his wrong. The same may be said with regard to mills. Neither would the loss be very considerable in regard of these: for, by the sinking of the rivers, those mills erected upon them, by a small alteration in their situation, with a small duct of water might be changed from *undershot* to *overshot* mills which would be a material improvement in them. But though the nation were to purchase all the wares and mills, so needful a work should not be put a stop

stop to upon that account. It is needless to observe how much it would conduce towards the facilitating the improvements of its bogs, and would certainly render the climate less humid.

During the other eight months these men might be employed in repairing the public roads, particularly about the towns, upon which turnpikes should be erected. Superannuated serjeants and old soldiers might be set over these; and the rates to be the same as in England. The money to be paid to the account of government: neither would these receipts be trifling. By those means, independently of the savings thereby in the public cesses, the roads near towns, instead of being almost impassable by means of carutts from the continual drawing of fuel, when formed of small or broken stones, as they should always be in moist climates, would be in excellent order, to the great satisfaction of their inhabitants.

Hence it is evident, that these 30,000 men are not intended to pass idle lives. On the contrary, for the seven years, for which term they were to be engaged, (officers, serjeants, and corporals, as in the regulars) they should be always employed. After cleansing, and paying their devotions every Sunday, they might be engaged in learning the manual exercise. Our half-pay of-

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ficers, whether of the army or navy, to be promoted to full pay in this militia, the remaining commissions to be sold. Upon the prospect of war, we then should have 30,000 stout fellows, *inured to labour*, ready to draft into either the land or sea service. Men, moreover, acquainted and personally known to their officers: a circumstance always much to be desired.

As it would be my object to have the best and most decent of the lower class of people in this militia, their pay should be 5s. a week, 1s. 6d. of which should be regularly placed in a tontine scheme under government security, 6d. a day would be sufficient for cloathing and maintenance. This 1s. 6d. a week, with the accumulating interest, would, at the expiration of their seven years service, perhaps amount to 30*l*. For the payments of those who died, or were expelled for misbehaviour, should be divided among the others, which would be a good tie upon all for their good behaviour.

Perhaps a militia of this nature of 60,000 men for Great Britain would not be ineligible. In this case the common men should be sought for in Ireland and Scotland, where man's labour is of the less value, and of course the less productive and beneficial to the community. This would also put a stop to emigrations to America,
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by raising the value of the labour of the remaining. So great a body of half civilized men, after a seven years apprenticeship to a laborious, industrious, and regular life, would be an invaluable acquisition to their native countries. Their little funds would enable them to take farms, marry, settle and rear up their offspring, in a stile much superior to what they can at all aspire to at present. In fact, in thirty years it would be the means of civilizing those two nations, and bringing them nearly to a par with England.

How greatly would the proprietors of land in Ireland and Scotland be benefited by it! instead of letting their lands to poor creatures, who perhaps may have value to the amount of 8*l.* or 10*l.* these new tenants, with the advantageous marriages they would be enabled to make, might be well set down as having property to the amount of 50*l.* Independently of this consideration, I trust that making so many of the human species happy, would be a motive sufficiently powerful with Irishmen to support their portion of the expences of such an establishment. That it would tend more to the amelioration of the morals of the poor than 10,000 Sunday schools, will be acknowledged by those, who form their opinions of mankind from experience, and not

the cobweb systems of closet-writers. To think of impressing the Poor with just notions of moral rectitude, founded upon metaphysical abstraction, is an idea worthy of *Jean Jacques Rousseau*. Those who have not leisure for reflection cannot attain to that excellence which consists in regulating the moral affections from virtuous motives. The virtues of the Poor are temperance, frugality and industry. Action being happiness, whether of the mind or body: if possessed of the former virtues, their greatest possible happiness in this life depends on themselves.

But the objection is the expence. Having already, as I apprehend, provided funds for raising an additional revenue of upwards of three millions sterling upon Great Britain only, which is a million and a half more than the expence that her proportion would amount to, at the rate of 25*l.* a man, including officers, without even deducting any thing on account of the receipts at the turnpikes, or on account of the half-pay of the officers and serjeants, &c. which would be saved by their being put upon full-pay. That the amount of all these would be very considerable, cannot be doubted. Methinks also that those miserable wretches, immured at Greenwich, might be well employed as gate-keepers; and thus cheaply made happy by having something
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to do. The founders of hospitals must have had most erroneous notions of human happiness, to suppose that it was at all compatible with a life of idleness. To think of making the veteran happy, by immuring him in a cold, comfortless palace, and placing him amongst individuals, little known or attached to him, was a most preposterous idea. The soldier's happiness consists in relating to the youth of his native village his actions and adventures: "I was with the
 " gallant Rodney, when De Grasse in the Ville
 " de Paris, after a brave defence, struck to our
 " noble Admiral." "I fought under Meadows, when we repulsed D'Estaing at St.
 " Lucie." "I saw Washington." "I saw Tip-
 " po Sultaun." The greatest happiness which a veteran is capable of enjoying consists in relations of this nature.

Et hæc olim meminisse juvabit.

THE PRESS.

IT is a well known truth that there is no good without its alloy, and this may be truly asserted of the Liberty of the Press. The licentiousness of our prints, in regard even of individuals, who are of no political consequence, is frequently of so very atrocious a nature, as to merit very severe chastisement : for private peace should be as much the object of every well-regulated government as the security of property. But what individual, howsoever obscure, can now be certain, that his, or some of his family's feelings may not be wounded in the most sensible manner in the morrow's paper? This is doubtless an evil of a very serious and alarming nature. Its tendency is evidently to deprive us of the Liberty of the Press, without which, constituted as our government actually is, our liberties could not long subsist. To discover the remedy which will secure the one without endangering the other is the difficulty, and it must be acknowledged to be no small one. Were our constitution modelled agreeably to the sketch which I
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have ventured to offer, founded upon the ideas of Aristotle, an easy and effectual remedy at once presents itself: namely, by lodging in the Council of one hundred a censorial power. The Members of this Council being elected by the citizens, the judgment of it, or a *quorum* of them, might be held equivalent to that of the citizens themselves. For, as Aristotle has observed in regard of Athens, were not the judgment vested in the citizens, its liberties would be quickly destroyed by a tyrannous Aristocracy: how much more surely, in a government constituted as ours. The Members of this Council being elected for a certain term of years, and being all men of *fifty* years of age, and of independent circumstances, and if thought advisable, *irremoveable*, and, incapable of holding any other employment, must be uninfluenced by government. Its power over the press might extend to a summary punishment of the proprietor, or even suppressing the paper for its breach of public decorum, without however debarring the injured person from seeking satisfaction by process of law. Its power ought likewise to be extended to licentious publications of every description.

PUBLIC LIBRARY.

AS we know from the experience of ages, that that nation which excels in literary accomplishments, possesses, *ceteris paribus*, great advantages over other nations, when necessary to make war upon them, if inferior in such acquirements. It therefore becomes the wisdom of every well-constituted government to provide the means for facilitating the acquisition of knowledge among its people. The benefit being national, should be borne by the nation, even though it amounted to the expence of some regiments: yet, instead of being a burthen to the nation, it might be brought, I apprehend, to yield a small revenue: perhaps as much as would be necessary to pay the interest of the first expence, and to support the institution afterwards.

With regard to all plans for libraries, which I have either read or heard of, whether founded by the subscription of individuals, or at the expence of government, I never met with any that hit my idea of one, which would completely answer a scholar, who frequently wants a great number

number of volumes, and for an indefinite length of time. Without wasting the reader's time with pointing out the defects of other plans, I shall offer my own.

First, I would have a large building erected, the upper part of it disposed in such a manner as to contain the greatest number of books possible. Here librarians should remain during the stated hours. No other persons should have the privilege of reading or examining any books in the library, nor even to be admitted into it, unless accompanied by a subscriber, and then only with the view of seeing it. Each subscriber to pay annually 2*l.* 2*s.* Besides which, when he wanted a book, he was to deposit its value, to be returned when the book was returned : if he wanted 1000 volumes, upon depositing their value, they were to be furnished to him, with the proviso that he was answerable for extra-damage. Were a library founded upon this plan, scholars who lived at a distance might have whatever books they wanted : and had they learned and expensive works in view, they would not be deterred from prosecuting them, from the necessity of advancing 500*l.* or 1000*l.* in the purchase of books ; and which, independently of present inconvenience, might be of little value to their families at their decease, which

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must have prevented many ingenious men from prosecuting works of this nature. In some cases it might not be improper to give out books upon getting undoubted security for their value, and the regular payment of the interest.

Upon the ground floor there should be two spacious rooms, with a librarian in each, one for holding Encyclopedias, Lexicons, Dictionaries, Atlases, and other articles that would not be advisable to lend out. The other for books of natural history, and other curious and expensive works. The remaining part of the ground-floor to be divided into spacious apartments for literary societies : the freedom of each to be a guinea additional to each subscriber. By this means every person, who chose to be of one of these societies, might be certain of meeting that sort of entertainment best suited to his taste or studies. Subscribers always to have the privilege of introducing foreigners into the society or societies of which they were members.

That an establishment of this sort is a *desideratum* in this great city, which would add to its attractions, and besides tend greatly to the acquisition of sound learning, particularly were our government taken out of the hands of boys, and put into the hands of men, cannot be disputed. For then, instead of those *ephemeride* whip-sillabub
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productions with which the press swarms, and which, with fluency of style, are sufficiently attractive and convincing to persons of little experience or knowledge, it would be found necessary to compose works with that care and attention, as to arrest the attention of judicious men, our governors, if it was expected by their authors that they should be attended to. For, let the taste of the governors be what it may, history evinces, that the productions of the human mind take their complexion from it.

I shall add a few additional observations.

The editor of the Morning Chronicle has inserted in that print some passages from *Sir John Dalrymple*, from which it appears that this ingenious writer is strongly against a Russian war. The argument adduced is, that if the American war ought *not* to be prosecuted from the fear of losing 3 millions of customers, much less ought a Russian war, which may occasion the loss of 24 millions of customers. This argument is, I apprehend insolid: for, though the Americans have established their independency, yet England

possesses the greatest part of her commerce : and should Russia absolutely proscribe our commerce, she would thereby only lay a heavy tax upon her subjects without effecting it ; as her subjects, being accustomed to them would have them by one means or other ; perhaps under the description of French or Dutch manufactures. Thus an axe which the English merchant might sell for 2*s.* a French or Dutch merchant might well charge 2*s.* 6*d.* for, as he must be paid for his trouble and hazard, besides the double freight, insurance, &c. A step of this nature would therefore greatly impoverish her own subjects, and their improvement in civilization, her primary object.

Secondly, the proportion between the commerce of England and Russia is, in regard of the population of the two countries, by no means proportionably so great as that between England and America, for then it ought to be eight times greater ; which is by no means the case : nay, it is not even equal to that of America, and for this very substantial reason, that an American, by his daily labour, will earn thrice as much as a Russian peasant or slave ; and a man's expences in general are always in proportion to his income. If then the income of 3 *millions* of Americans equals
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that of 9 *millions* of Russians, and that we had an absolute command of both markets, the 3 *millions* of Americans would want manufactures to an equal amount as the 9 *millions* of Russians. But they would even require a great deal more ; for, besides what was necessary for the American's support, and which his lands would produce, equally cheap, at the least, as the Russian's, all the remainder of his earnings would be expended in manufactures and artificial wants ; but with the daily earnings of a Russian, perhaps 3*d.* a day, it would be ridiculous in him to think of purchasing the manufactures of Britain. The Irish labourer, with double the wages buys none of them. Farther, though a market, in the opinion of a manufacturer, might be deemed a fit subject for going to war, yet it should be deemed only a secondary motive in that of a statesman, as he must know that that nation which is possessed of power, may always command a market. But power is only relative, so that though a country be growing more powerful, she ought to take care that another state should not increase her power ten times faster than herself : for then notwithstanding her growing *positively* more powerful, yet *relatively* she would be otherwise, and in process of time would become an insignificant state.

state. The ancient republic of Rhodes; and the modern ones of Genoa, Venice, and Holland, evince the truth of it.

The great objection to Democratical republics is the want of vigour, even though they were free of every other defect. This want of vigour arises solely from the impossibility of their governors being able to raise a large public revenue. This has never been effected, nor ever will be effected under this form of government. Therefore such states must become easy conquests when attacked by other states, when of nearly equal force, and better constituted for active exertions. Oligarchical republics, being timorous, selfish, and covetous, are still less capable of resistance.

This accounts for Macedon acquiring a superiority over the Grecian republics. Had not Athens, after the expulsion of the 30 tyrants, become a perfect democracy, it might, under another Pericles, have successfully resisted Philip. And, notwithstanding the moderns are unanimous respecting the security of Switzerland, I scruple not to affirm, that it would not stand a single campaign, notwithstanding its numerous militia, and the courage of its inhabitants, against the forces of the Emperor or King of Prussia ;
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and that no country in Europe, of equal resources, would make less resistance to an enterprising enemy : and, notwithstanding democratical boastings, that the American states are also incapable of resisting a powerful enemy, as perhaps they may have shortly an opportunity of trying : and that, if the affairs of this country be conducted with ability, these states may once more become a portion of the British empire, but upon liberal terms, and that without firing a gun. In this case however, neither merchants nor manufacturers should be at all attended to.

Democratical governments are besides inimical to true philosophy, which solely regards ethics. This was a subject, which till after the humiliation of Athens by Philip, was not allowed, even there, to be freely discussed. The fate of Socrates is well known. *Anaxagoras*, though befriended by *Pericles*, was obliged to flee his country, to avoid a similar fate, which was pronounced against him by the Athenians : the dread of which was also the cause of the ablest and most enterprising citizen, that she ever produced, Alcibiades, becoming her severest foe. Nor in speculations of this nature, do I find that modern democracies surpass
other

other European states. The Swiss Cantons, under this form of government, with regard to religious tenets, are Catholics : and if I may be permitted to form a judgment of the others, from one of them which I travelled through, their mental accomplishments are of the very lowest order. There are some learned men among the Swiss, but very few philosophers : for physiologists by no means merit this title*.

I am sensible there will be many objections, or prejudices against some things which I have proposed. First, concerning the direct tax on the Poor : yet, no tax can be more judicious, where there is a constant demand for Labour. The mechanic and manufacturer will then be obliged, in some degree, to work every day, instead of sacrificing two or three days in the week in excess and idleness, each of which will render him a worse workman. I say this, even though the proposed poll-tax would be heavier on the poor than the present taxes. However, a tax of this sort should not be attempted before the organization of the *ninety* thousand militia.

* Philo Judæus, p. 435. Paris.

With regard to the advanced age before the attainment of the right of citizenship, it will be objected: What! is the nation to lose the splendid abilities of future Foxes and Pitts for such a period? Yes, truly. Meteors appearing in any state evince a defect in its constitution according to Aristotle. The prosperity of states should be gradually progressive, and not by fits and starts. Moreover, notwithstanding the acknowledged capacity of these two gentlemen, and of which few persons bear a stronger testimony, or more frequently than myself, yet as legislators, they have shewn but little. Mr. Fox's India bill, which would have constituted an *imperium in imperio*, and his observations on the Canada bill, determine his pretensions to the character of a legislator. An *imperium in imperio* is universally condemned by every writer on politics, as defeating the end of government. With respect to Canada, Mr. Fox is for having the legislative assembly annually or triennially elected, with an universal right of suffrage. Such a constitution must necessarily terminate in an Ochlocracy, or a many-headed despotism. Mr. Pitt is for first securing the Oligarchical branch of the constitution, which though *hereditary*, he is pleased to decorate with the title of *Aristocracy*,

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which necessarily infers election : but an Oligarchy is an *illegitimate*, or *corrupt* form of government : it is the corruption of an Aristocracy : so, that Mr. Pitt's first object is to establish a *corrupt* principle ! The appeals in the bill will be for ever creating heart-burnings ; and though the Minister's view is obvious, must tend more to sever that colony from Britain, than to strengthen the connection. The final appeal should be always to the citizens, or those Judges appointed by them*. Retaining a tenth part of the soil for the clergy is a matter of little moment, as in a country, where land *in fee* may be had for a song, no one will accept land which is to go to his successor, except merely for a commonage. And ere these commonages are of any account, the fate of the clergy, throughout the world, will be determined. The clergy should yield gradually to the temper of the times : by doing so, they will be able to preserve something ; but should they persevere in an obstinate resistance, it does not require the spirit of prophecy to foretell that they will become the victims of the fanatical excesses of the Democratists, as in a

* Aristotle, l. 4. c. 14.

neighbouring kingdom. In my apprehension we should not be fond of legislating for our colonies : we are too imperfectly acquainted with their local circumstances, not to fall into errors, which will always give a handle to the enemies of government to estrange the affections of the colony from the parent state. A chief governor appointed by his Majesty, from whom all the executive officers were to derive their powers, methinks is as much as England should claim. A poll-tax, regulated by the same principle as laid down with regard to England, should be the price of protection, and of acquiring the privileges of being a member of the British empire. Were the colonies *independent*, the necessary taxes for this end would not be much less. But the advantages resulting from their being members of the empire, would alone outbalance this tax ; for then they would have the liberty of importing into Britain, or any of her dependencies, the natural products of their soil, and of carrying away in return the products of Britain and its dependencies ; whereas the latter should be absolutely interdicted to the *United States* : and the importation of the natural products of other countries, and especially of the *United States*, should be subjected to very heavy du-

ties. By this means a spur would be given to the industry of our own colonies, which would be conducive to their wealth and happiness, and would always be a tie upon their loyalty : and at the same time represents the increasing prosperity of the *United States*, the implacable enemies of this government ; but it would also render them far more pliable in regard of a re-union with the mother country.

Throughout these sheets I have made use of the term Demagogue, according to its original genuine signification, as descriptive of a person, who, by giving into the humours and propensities of the people, misleads them from their true interest. Those who acted in this manner were by the ancients always supposed to be governed by sinister views. The ignorance of nineteen in twenty of the moderns, concerning the true principles of government, exempts them in a great measure from this charge.

In the debate upon Mr. Grey's motion, it was laid down by Mr. Sheridan* that the constitution of this country consists in a wise blending and co-operation of the executive and legislative branches.

* See Diary.

This position I affirm to be unfounded, either in regard to theory or practice. No one will pretend that, before the accession of the *House of Stuart*, the Lords or Commons claimed any *constitutional right* of interfering with the executive branch, in what concerned peace or war; of course this must be a novel claim, and without any constitutional foundation. It is true, that since the revolution, cowardly and ignorant Ministers have permitted, nay, have invited the Lords and Commons to interfere in the executive branch of government. But now that the theory of our constitution is better understood, those encroachments upon the King's prerogative should be yielded up; and the government itself adjusted agreeably to its acknowledged theory. That such a *blending* is contrary to the theory of our constitution, is evident from Aristotle's vesting in such a political constitution as ours, the *entire executive* power in the person of the King—the *legislative* in the General Council—and the *judicial* in the Citizens. By this means the three branches are accurately distinguished, and their several functions marked by a broad line. Whereas a *wise blending* could never be settled, for no two would ever be able to agree about it. It was also denied, and given up by the friends of the Ministry, that *implicit confidence*

dence ought not to be given to government in what regards our connections with foreign states. This I also affirm to be unconstitutional. For the functions of the Legislative Councils being confined to the enacting and repealing of laws, redressing grievances, and seeing that the public money was honestly expended ; it follows, that the declaring war or making peace, or entering into treaties, not coming under any of the above heads, that the power adequate to these purposes, is *constitutionally* and *solely* vested in the executive branch. Besides a *limited confidence* is an absurdity ; and were it not so, is impolitic ; for the greater the confidence reposed, the more responsible the person in whom it is vested.

Mr. Burke must have been doubtless amazed at Mr. Fox's eulogium of the French constitution at the conclusion of the debate on Mr. Baker's motion. It only evinces that no capacity will enable a person to be a legislator without extensive reading and deep reflection. Men of business, besides, are not capable of this office. They have not the leisure requisite to form the comprehensive mind, or true philosopher. Aristotle has observed, that all the great legislators of antiquity were private individuals, even Lycurgus himself.

Though

Though I think it highly improper, during a debate, to declare, that one set of men would conduct the national business better than those in possession of the reins of government; for this can not be known until we have had experience of it, which, unless the Democratists should overturn the government, is not likely shortly to happen. Yet, upon this point, I profess that I have entirely altered my opinion, being firmly convinced the *Inns* far exceed the *Outs* in political capacity. The patriotism and political capacity of the *Outs* may be fairly gathered from their conduct in regard to the wool-bill—the Indian war—the floating balances—and the Russian negotiation.—With respect to the first, the wool bill was a beneficial measure, or it was not: if the former, the opposition Members should have attended their duty, and urged forward the business: if it was a hurtful measure they should have attended, and openly opposed its passing. And though it did pass, their eloquence and abilities might have been the means of opening the eyes of their countrymen; whereas, by their blinking the question, individuals, who take up their little knowledge from the reporters of the debates, think it a measure of little or no importance. Government being under thralldom to the manufacturers, dared not,

not, unsupported by the country gentlemen, and opposed by a virulent opposition, withhold its support to a measure, though clearly inimical to the general weal.

Mr. Pitt founds his claim, it seems, to honest fame, from the issue of the Russian negotiation. I doubt not it will be conducted with great ability. But Mr. Pitt's fame, in my opinion, will be more truly estimated, from his conduct with respect to the *floating balances*, lying in the hands of the Directors of the Bank. I am sure the opposition would never, *for such a trifle*, the nation's right, have risked their popularity with the monied interest. Mr. Pitt's persevering in this business, should satisfy every honest man, that his object is honest fame; and whilst it continues to be so, that he ought to meet their firm support.

I trust the perfecting the constitution will next engage his attention. The times demand it. Our constitution is so wretchedly bad, that were it not for the extent of the state, we should be in continual convulsions. But, fortunately while in a fever in London, the extremities are quite cool; and by the time that the fever has reached the extremities, the head has returned to its customary indifference; which would be quite otherwise, were the state confined to a few square leagues

leagues as the antient republics. This evinces the superior intellect of the legislators who devised such regulations as controuled the actions of freemen, who were the standing army of the state.

In a word, I deem it to be a *truism*, that before men have arrived at the usual *acme* of the human intellect, they should have no concern with the government upon which the happiness and prosperity of so many millions depends.

Also, that all persons engaged in illiberal employments or professions, and who were not possessed of an independency, ought likewise to be excluded from any share in it.

F I N I S.

T

E R R A T A.

Page 58, note, read Miller's View of the English Constitution.

Page 87, note, line 2, dele her.

